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Abstract 
This study examines the impact of having a credit rating on earnings management (EM) through 
accruals and real activities manipulation by initial public offering (IPO) firms. We find that firms going 
public with a credit rating are less likely to engage in income-enhancing accrual-based and real EM in 
the offering year. The monitoring by a credit rating agency (CRA) and the reduced information 
asymmetry due to the provision of a credit rating disincentivise rated issuers from managing earnings. 
We also suggest that the participation of a reputable auditing firm is crucial for CRAs to effectively 
restrain EM. Moreover, we document that for unrated issuers, at-issue income-increasing EM is not 
linked to future earnings and negatively related to post-issue long-run stock performance. However, 
for rated issuers, at-issue income-increasing EM is positively associated with subsequent accounting 
performance and unrelated to long-run stock performance following the offering. The evidence 
indicates that managers in unrated firms generally manipulate earnings to mislead investors, while 
managers in rated firms tend to exercise their accounting and operating discretion for informative 
purposes.  
 
JEL classification: G10, G14, G24, G3 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Earnings are a crucial indicator of firm performance, as investors commonly rely on them to 
value stocks. Consequently, managers have strong motives to manipulate earnings to influence short-
term stock prices. The incentives of managers are stronger around IPOs due to the high level of 
information asymmetry between inside managers and outside investors. Various studies investigating 
EM in the IPO markets find evidence of income-increasing EM around IPOs and a negative association 
between at-issue EM and post-issue long-run stock performance, suggesting that managers can mislead 
investors to opportunistically manage earnings (Aharony et al. 1993; Friedlan 1994; Teoh et al. 1998a; 
Teoh et al. 1998b; Roosenbloom and Van De Goot 2003; DuCharme et al. 2004; Gramlich and 
Sorensen 2004). The accounting research also demonstrates that certain parties, such as audit 
committees, boards of directors, external auditors, venture capitalists, and underwriters, can restrain 
EM (Becker et al. 1998; Klein 2002; Morsfield and Tan 2006; Lee and Masulis 2011). However, to 
our knowledge, the influence of CRAs on EM by IPO firms has not been explored.  
We hypothesise that CRAs disincentivise IPO issuers from engaging in EM through their two 
main economic functions as an information intermediary and a monitor. By acting as an information 
intermediary, CRAs provide an independent assessment of the creditworthiness of a borrowing entity 
or a debt issue. In evaluating the firm, credit analysts thoroughly review both public sources of 
information and relevant private information provided by managers. Particularly, after the enactment 
of the Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD), credit analysts can have access to confidential information 
which is not made available to other investment professionals such as equity analysts (Jorion et al. 
2005). Therefore, CRAs provide the market with information beyond publicly available sources, 
contributing to alleviating information asymmetries in the IPO markets (An and Chan 2008; Chan and 
Lo 2011). Besides their informational role, CRAs also serve an important function as monitors 
(Arnoud et al. 2006; Bannier and Hirsch 2010; Bonsall et al. 2015). CRAs conduct due diligence on 
the issuer in the initial rating. They subsequently keep track of the developments that may affect the 
issuer’s risk profiles to adjust their rating accordingly. Reputational concerns and heightened 
regulatory oversight also strengthen CRAs’ incentives to thoroughly monitor the firm (Cheng and 
Neamtiu 2009). The monitoring by CRAs and the reduced information asymmetry due to the provision 
of a credit rating make financial reporting misbehaviours more likely to be detected, thereby 
disincentivising rated IPO firms from opportunistically managing earnings. Moreover, the lower 
information asymmetries may encourage high-quality rated issuers to signal their future prospects by 
employing accounting discretion to convey private information to less-informed investors because 
investors will be more likely to accurately interpret that information.  
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Due to the distinct roles of CRAs in the capital markets and the gap in the literature on the 
influence of CRAs on EM around IPOs, we seek to answer the following research questions: (1) 
whether rated IPO firms are less likely to engage in EM in the offering year, and (2) whether rated IPO 
firms employ their accounting and operating discretion to better inform the market. To address these 
questions, we analyse a sample of U.S. common share IPOs over the period 1991–2011. In order to 
establish a complete view of EM, we investigate two EM methods: (1) accrual-based EM, which 
involves exploiting the accounting discretion over the recognition of accruals, and (2) real EM, which 
entails altering the timing or structuring of real economic activities. Moreover, we account for the self-
selection bias, which occurs due to the firm’s choice to obtain a credit rating, and the endogeneity 
problem, which happens due to the potential correlation between EM determinants and factors 
influencing the firm’s decision to solicit a credit rating. We employ alternative econometric techniques 
to address the endogenous selection issue including Heckman’s (1979) two-step treatment effect 
model, the maximum likelihood treatment effect model, and the instrumental variable model. 
We find that rating existence is negatively associated with income-enhancing accrual-based and 
real EM in the offering year. Credit rating levels, however, do not appear to explain the variation in 
EM around IPOs. Controlling for the interaction effects between CRAs and venture capitalists, top-
tier underwriters and big six auditors, we document the impact of CRAs on reducing EM remains, but 
less pronounced, in the presence of these financial intermediaries. Particularly, the participation of a 
prestigious underwriter is crucial for a CRA to significantly exert its influence on real EM. Having a 
reputable auditor also enables CRAs to effectively restrain both accrual-based and real EM by IPO 
issuers. Furthermore, rating existence influences income-increasing EM in the offering year and also 
affects managers’ intention of exercising their accounting and operating discretion to report higher 
earnings. We reveal that for unrated firms, at-issue income-increasing EM is unrelated to subsequent 
earnings and negatively linked to long-run stock performance following the offering. However, for 
rated firms, at-issue income-increasing EM is positively related to future accounting performance and 
not associated with post-issue long-run stock performance. The evidence suggests that unrated issuers 
tend to manage earnings upward to mislead investors, while rated issuers are more likely to employ 
discretion in accounting and operating decisions to better inform the market. It also supports the role 
of a credit rating in mitigating the information asymmetry around IPOs. Lower information asymmetry 
alleviates information uncertainty and allows investors to more immediately recognise EM and adjust 
for it in their stock valuation; therefore, the post-issue long-run stock returns are insignificantly related 
to at-issue EM.  
Our study makes several contributions to the IPO, EM, and credit rating literature. Prior studies 
document opportunistic accrual-based EM around IPOs (Aharony et al. 1993; Friedlan 1994; Teoh et 
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al. 1998a; Teoh et al. 1998b; Roosenbloom and Van De Goot 2003; DuCharme et al. 2004) and 
highlight the roles of financial intermediaries including auditors, venture capitalists, and investment 
banks in restraining EM (Morsfield and Tan 2006; Venkataraman et al. 2008; Lee and Masulis 2011; 
Hochberg 2012; Wongsunwai 2013). Our findings provide new empirical evidence to support the 
impact of another important intermediary in the capital markets—CRAs on EM around IPOs. 
Moreover, we examine both accrual-based and real EM to gain more complete insight into EM 
activities of IPO firms. In addition, Chen et al. (2013) argue that the extent of information uncertainty 
around IPOs affects issuers’ motives to engage in EM. Specifically, high-information-uncertainty 
firms opportunistically manipulate earnings, while low-information-uncertainty firms manage 
earnings for informative purposes. Prior research on CRAs in the IPO markets (e.g., An and Chan 
(2008), Chan and Lo (2011)) suggests that credit ratings convey useful information that can reduce the 
information asymmetry around IPOs. We present further empirical evidence of the significance of 
information environment in influencing managerial incentives to manage earnings. Specifically, we 
show that lower information uncertainty due to the existence of a credit rating allows investors to more 
correctly interpret managers’ messages. Therefore, rated issuers are more motivated to employ 
accounting and operating discretion to signal firm value. Additionally, our findings are applicable to 
an international context as the issue of EM is prevalent in international IPOs (e.g., Roosenboom et al. 
(2003), Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2011), Alhadab et al. (2014), Kouwenberg and Thontirawong (2015), 
and Alhadab et al. (2016)) and CRAs are globally recognised as a crucial information intermediary 
and a gatekeeper of the capital markets. The paper also provides important implications for 
practitioners and regulators in evaluating the financial reporting quality of firms going public with a 
credit rating. For sophisticated investors, our results suggest that the presence of a credit rating can 
signal higher-quality financial reporting in terms of lower opportunistic EM around IPOs.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature and hypothesis 
development. Section 3 describes our sample and methodology. Section 4 explains empirical models 
of the impact of credit ratings on EM and the association between at-issue EM and post-issue 
accounting and stock performance. Section 5 presents empirical results. Section 6 provides robustness 
checks for our findings. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
2.1. Earnings management around IPOs 
The theoretical underpinning of our study is agency theory. An important feature of this theory 
is that it views the firm as a nexus of contracting relationships such as those between executives and 
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stakeholders. It is largely concerned with the principal-agent problem due to conflicts of interest 
between the principal (e.g., shareholders) and the agent (e.g., company executives) that arise in the 
presence of information asymmetry between the two parties (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The 
information asymmetry mainly involves the issues of adverse selection and moral hazard. An adverse 
selection problem occurs when managers have access to private information relevant to decision 
making. On the other hand, a moral hazard problem happens when managers make decisions that are 
not aligned with shareholders’ interests, yet the latter are unable to observe these actions. Managers’ 
EM choices can be driven by information asymmetries (Dye 1988; Trueman and Titman 1988). When 
information asymmetries are present, accounting choices can serve as a channel through which insiders 
can effectively convey information about the magnitude, timing, and risk of future cash flows to less-
informed outsiders; however, compensation, reputation, or other self-interested incentives may induce 
managers to take advantage of the information disparity to inflate earnings to influence stock prices 
(Fields et al. 2001).  
High information asymmetries are inherent in the IPO markets. When a firm goes public, it 
discloses its financial information for the first time on the prospectus, which includes financial 
statements for up to the most recent three years. Public sources of information about private firms are 
limited. Therefore, much private and valuable information about a new issuer prior to the offering is 
in the possession of its managers, preventing external investors from thoroughly understanding the 
firm (Cheung and Krinsky 1994; Barzel et al. 2006; Balatbat 2006). This information disparity between 
investors and issuers and the lack of reliable independent information sources make it difficult for 
investors to evaluate the appropriateness of reported accounting figures in reflecting the firm’s future 
performance. Thus, self-interested managers have strong incentives to opportunistically manipulate 
reported earnings at the time of the IPO to inflate stock prices. In the immediate post-IPO period, the 
lock-up restriction for the managerial sale of shares, earnings projections, and risks of future lawsuits 
due to an abnormal drop in stock prices are argued to induce managers to continue to manage earnings 
upward to maintain high stock prices at the end of the IPO year (Teoh et al. 1998b).  
Research on EM around IPOs mainly analyses managers’ use of accruals in the period of taking 
their firms public and finds evidence of income-increasing accrual-based EM around the IPOs 
(Aharony et al. 1993; Friedlan 1994; Teoh et al. 1998b; DuCharme 2001; DuCharme et al. 2004; 
Marquardt and Wiedman 2004; Morsfield and Tan 2006; Lee and Masulis 2011)2. International studies 
                                                          
2 Ball and Shivakumar (2008) provide a contrary finding. They argue that IPOs attract the attention of regulators and various 
parties such as auditors, analysts, investors, and the press; thus, issuers are more pressured to provide higher-quality financial reports. 
Examining a sample of UK firms whose financial statements filed as private firms are comparable to those restated and presented in the 
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also confirm the aggressive use of accruals by IPO firms in various countries such as the Netherlands 
(Roosenboom et al. 2003), the United Kingdom (Alhadab et al. 2014; Alhadab et al. 2016), and Asian 
countries (Ahmad-Zaluki et al. 2011; Kouwenberg and Thontirawong 2015). Despite the extensive 
research on accrual-based EM around IPOs, evidence on real EM by IPO issuers is less documented. 
Darrough and Rangan (2005) argue that IPO firms upwardly manage earnings in the issue year by 
reducing research and development (R&D) expenses. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) find the evidence of 
real EM around seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and document a greater decrease in operating 
performance due to real EM than due to accrual-based EM in the post-SEO period. Alhadab et al. 
(2014) report that UK IPO firms engage in both accrual-based and real EM during the offering year in 
order to overstate earnings. The levels of accrual-based and sales-based EM are higher among IPO 
firms on the lightly regulated UK Alternative Investment Market than among those on the more heavily 
regulated UK Main Market (Alhadab et al. 2016).   
 
2.2. Credit ratings and earnings management around IPOs 
We hypothesise that CRAs can influence EM around IPOs by alleviating the agency problem 
via two mechanisms: information dissemination and monitoring. 
Informational role of credit rating agencies 
CRAs provide the market with their independent assessment of the firm’s creditworthiness based 
on publicly disclosed information in securities filings and relevant private information gathered in the 
process of due diligence. They assess the likelihood that an issuer will default on its financial 
obligations by reviewing both financial and non-financial factors such as macroeconomics 
environment, market conditions, competitive trends, corporate governance, growth prospects, 
operations and risk management, business plan, and financial position statements. Credit analysts also 
conduct in-depth interviews and discussions with company managers to obtain additional information 
and clarification about management policies, current positions, and future plans that may influence the 
rating. Research on the informational content of rating announcements (e.g., Holthausen and Leftwich 
(1986), Hand et al. (1992), Dichev and Piotroski (2001)) shows that rating changes significantly 
influence stock prices, suggesting that CRAs provide valuable information to market participants. 
Particularly, in 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enacted the Regulation FD, 
                                                          
IPO prospectuses, they document that IPO firms tend to report more conservatively in response to increasing demand for higher-quality 
financial reporting by capital market participants. Nevertheless, Lo (2008) argues that sophisticated managers are more likely to provide 
non-comparable reports to make their earnings manipulation less detectable; therefore, the restrictive sample selection by Ball and 
Shivakumar (2008) may exclude firms that engage in EM, and the conclusion of no income-enhancing EM by IPO firms may not hold. 
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which prohibits publicly traded companies from selectively disclosing private material information to 
their preferred investment professionals. As CRAs are excluded from the Regulation FD, managers 
can provide credit analysts with relevant private information about the firm. Therefore, credit ratings 
convey additional information to the market beyond what is publicly disclosed, contributing to 
bridging the information gap between issuers and investors. Jorion et al. (2005) show that the 
informational impact of credit ratings strengthened significantly after the implementation of the 
Regulation FD. Prior studies also document the role of credit ratings in reducing the information 
asymmetry problem in the IPO markets (e.g., An and Chan (2008), Chan and Lo (2011)).  
Monitoring role of credit rating agencies 
The economic role of CRAs goes beyond mitigating information asymmetries. CRAs are widely 
considered to be important gatekeepers of the capital markets. Employing their expertise, established 
methodologies, and access to a wide pool of both public and private information, they provide the 
market with their assessment of the issuer’s creditworthiness. Through the initial investigation, CRAs 
exert monitoring impacts on the issuer (Bonsall et al. 2015). CRAs’ monitoring function is also 
apparent in their surveillance procedure. After the initial rating, credit analysts maintain periodic 
contact with the issuer’s management to track developments that may affect the issuer’s credit risk 
profiles. As a result of the surveillance analysis, CRAs may adjust the credit rating to reflect timely 
changes in their opinion of the issuer’s creditworthiness. Bannier and Hirsch (2010) argue that CRAs 
appear to have fulfilled an active monitoring role through their rating review procedures.  
CRAs’ incentives to monitor are strengthened by their reputational concerns. The credit rating 
market is concentrated with a limited number of competitors. Thus, the survival and future profitability 
of CRAs is largely dependent on their reputation, which is directly affected by the performance of the 
issuer after the rating. To maintain and improve their established reputation, it is crucial for CRAs to 
closely follow the issuer to assign timely and accurate ratings.  
There is a prevalent concern that CRAs’ monitoring may be weakened by the conflict of interests 
inherent in the issuer-pay model (i.e., the issuer pays the CRA for the rating). CRAs’ independence 
may also be compromised when the agency engages in other ancillary business services with the issuer 
besides the rating. Furthermore, in the past decade, CRAs have faced widespread criticism for their 
lack of rating timeliness in predicting prominent bankruptcies such as Enron in 2001, WorldCom in 
2002, Parmalat in 2003, and the subprime mortgage crisis in 2007–2008. In the aftermath of the 
financial crisis, CRAs have come under increased scrutiny. Several regulatory reforms have been 
implemented to enhance the regulation of CRAs, such as the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 
2006 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 in the U.S. as 
well as European Union directives such as the Capital Requirements Directive of 2006. Failing to 
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properly monitor the issuer and timely adjust ratings in order to predict a decline in credit quality is 
costly to CRAs, especially in terms of potential loss of reputation, additional regulatory burdens, and 
deterioration of future profitability. Cheng and Neamtiu (2009) show that CRAs improve their credit 
analysis when their market power is threatened by increased regulatory oversight and reputational 
concerns.  
Another relevant issue regards the monitoring of CRAs over the financial reporting process. 
Rating agencies rely largely on public and private information voluntarily provided by management; 
hence, the accuracy of their assessment depends considerably on complete and honest information 
disclosure. In evaluating the issuer, credit analysts use a substantial amount of information from 
financial statements; therefore, a crucial part of the rating analysis entails the assessment of the quality 
of reported accounting numbers (Jorion et al. 2009). Although CRAs count on the verification service 
of auditors and do not repeat their auditing work, following the aftermath of the Internet bubble period, 
CRAs recruit trained accountants to perform forensic accounting analysis and assist credit analysts in 
interpreting financial statements (Coffee 2006). Jorion et al. (2009) document that CRAs rationally 
employ stricter rating criteria upon firms that engage in aggressive EM and adjust their ratings 
downward to appropriately reflect the firms’ true underlying economics.  
Overall, the reduced information asymmetry due to the provision of credit ratings and the 
monitoring by CRAs will make it more likely to discover financial reporting misbehaviours. IPO firms 
will face severe consequences such as reputation loss, high costs of capital, and litigation risks if they 
are found to engage in accounting manipulation. Therefore, we expect that managers of rated IPO 
firms will have weaker incentives to manipulate earnings to influence stock prices. Based upon existing 
empirical evidence, we examine both accrual-based and real EM by IPO issuers in the offering year 
and predict that rated IPO firms are less likely to engage in both accrual-based and real EM to overstate 
earnings. Our first hypothesis is:  
H1: Rated IPO firms are less likely to engage in income-increasing EM (accrual-based EM and 
real EM) than unrated IPO firms in the offering year. 
 
2.3. At-issue earnings management and post-issue performance of rated IPO firms 
 Two opposing streams of literature have emerged regarding the managerial intent in managing 
earnings around IPOs. One stream supports the view that IPO is an opportunity for initial investors to 
cash their stock. Therefore, opportunistic managers have a motive to overstate earnings to maximise 
stock prices. Various studies support this view of managerial opportunism around IPOs (e.g., Aharony 
et al. (1993), Friedlan (1994), Teoh et al. (1998a), Teoh et al. (1998b), DuCharme et al. (2004), 
Morsfield and Tan (2006), Lee and Masulis (2011), Thomadakis et al (2016)). The other stream views 
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IPO as an external financing occasion; therefore, opportunistically managed earnings are undesirable 
as managed accruals will be reversed in subsequent periods and will consequently hurt post-IPO stock 
performance. In order to improve price efficiency and reduce the cost of capital, managers will seek 
to signal firm value to external investors. EM, in this view, is a means by which managers communicate 
private information about the firm’s future prospects to the market (Watts and Zimmerman 1978; 
Healy and Palepu 1993; Guay et al. 1996; Subramanyam 1996; Fields et al. 2001; Kallunki and 
Martikainen 2003; Louis and Robinson 2005; Herbohn et al. 2010).  
 The extent of information uncertainty may influence managerial intent in managing earnings. 
In the presence of high information uncertainty, self-interested managers have stronger incentives to 
opportunistically manipulate earnings because their financial reporting misbehaviours are less likely 
to be detected (Dye 1988; Trueman and Titman 1988; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Lo 2008). Meanwhile, 
managers whose incentives are to enhance price efficiency and lower the cost of capital may hesitate 
to voluntarily disclose private information as investors are less likely to correctly interpret that 
information (Dutta and Trueman 2002; Fishman and Hagerty 2003; Suijs 2007; Chen et al. 2013). 
However, in less-uncertain environments, stronger detection risks may keep self-interested managers 
from manipulating earnings. In addition, managers of high-quality firms can more effectively exercise 
their accounting discretion to convey inside information to the market because investors can more 
accurately realise and incorporate the information into their valuation. Chen et al. (2013) examine EM 
around IPOs operating in the environments of different levels of information uncertainty and find that 
while high-information-uncertainty firms manipulate earnings opportunistically, low-information-
uncertainty firms manage earnings for informative purposes. Along these lines, we expect that lower 
information uncertainty around IPOs due to the provision of a credit rating before the offering will 
also influence managerial incentives in undertaking EM. Managers of rated firms will utilise their 
accounting choices to mitigate the information asymmetry problem and signal the firm’s future 
prospects instead of opportunistically manipulating earnings for short-term self-interests. If managers 
of rated firms draw on their inside information and exercise their accounting discretion to better inform 
the market about the firm’s future earnings, the extent of income-increasing EM in the offering year 
will be positively related to subsequent accounting performance. Our second hypothesis is: 
 
H2: At-issue income-increasing EM is positively related to post-issue accounting performance 
for rated IPO firms.  
 
Extant literature (e.g., Teoh et al. (1998a), Teoh et al. (1998b), and Morsfield and Tan (2006)) 
documents a negative association between at-issue EM and post-issue long-run stock returns, 
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suggesting that managers opportunistically manage earnings to achieve higher offer prices while 
investors are unable to immediately recognise this behaviour. If managers manipulate earnings upward 
to inflate stock prices, in subsequent years, the reversal of accruals will drive down future earnings. 
High stock prices reflect investors’ optimistic expectations of the firm’s future profitability. Yet, if 
future earnings do not meet investors’ earlier expectations, they will adjust their evaluation of the firm 
downward. Therefore, IPO firms that opportunistically manage earnings upward in the offering year 
will exhibit poorer long-run stock performance in the post-issue periods. However, Fields (2001) 
suggests that positive EM can be intended to convey inside information to external investors so that 
the stock price can be fairly evaluated. Fan (2007) argues that high-quality IPO firms can use positive 
EM to a certain degree as a signaling device in order to separate themselves from low-quality firms. 
The author also documents that investors can accurately interpret the effect of EM when estimating 
the firm’s fundamental value. Chan and Lo (2011) find that rated IPO firms experience more 
immediate price correction and do not exhibit abnormal long-term stock performance. Their findings 
indicate that the provision of a credit rating before the new issue lowers information asymmetries and 
enables investors to correctly estimate the firm’s fair market value. As rated IPO firms tend to employ 
accounting choices to communicate private information to the market, we predict that the lower 
information uncertainty around rated IPO firms will allow the market to infer EM and correctly adjust 
for it in valuing the firm. Therefore, the post-issue long-run abnormal stock returns are expected to 
have no association with the at-issue income-increasing EM. This leads us to our third hypothesis: 
 
H3: At-issue income-increasing EM is not related to post-issue long-run stock performance for 
rated IPO firms. 
 
3. SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Sample description 
We construct a sample of U.S. common share IPOs during the period January 1, 1991, to 
December 31, 2011, from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) New Issues database3. Following 
IPO literature, we exclude IPOs with an offer price below $5 per share, unit offerings, limited 
partnerships, leveraged buyouts (LBOs), rights issues, American depositary receipts (ADRs), closed-
end funds, real estate investment trusts (REITs), financial institutions, spin-offs, and privatisations. 
                                                          
3 Compustat covers credit rating data from 1985. However, the statement of cash flow data is available for all firms in Compustat from 
1988, and we require past-year data to measure earnings management proxies. Thus, our IPO sample period starts from 1991. Moreover, 
we collect financial information and stock returns for three years following the issue to analyse the post-issue accounting and stock 
performance. 
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We then match this sample with the Compustat database where we obtain accounting information, and 
with the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) from which we gather stock returns. Credit 
ratings are collected from Compustat and represent Standard & Poor’s (S&P) long-term domestic 
issuer credit ratings. After imposing the aforementioned criteria, we arrive at a final sample of 2,602 
IPO firms. 
Table 1 presents the distribution of our sample by year, industry, and credit rating level. We 
observe a larger flow of IPOs in the 1990s, which is consistent with the recovery and expansion period 
of the U.S. economy after the 1990 recession. The early 2000s recession caused a downturn in the 
stock market. Subsequently, the overall IPO activity showed some improvement before declining again 
due to the financial crisis of 2007–2008. Our sample covers 57 industries identified by the two-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. Nearly half of the firms are concentrated in computer 
and high-technology industries (SIC codes 35, 36, 38, and 73). Rated issuers, however, are more 
strongly presented in manufacturing, transportation and public utilities, and wholesale and retail trade 
industries. Our overall sample has 153 IPOs with a credit rating one month prior to the stock issuance. 
The highest rating level is AAA and the lowest is CCC+. Approximately 2% of the issuers are in the 
A rating category and 4% receive investment-grade credit ratings. Nearly half of the firms obtain the 
rating of B+. The credit ratings of IPO firms are clustered in the rating categories of BB-, B+, and B. 
The ratings distribution is consistent with recent research on credit ratings of IPO firms (e.g., An and 
Chan (2008)). 
 
[Please insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the overall sample and the sub-samples of IPOs with and 
without a credit rating. Regarding firm characteristics, a typical IPO firm operates for 16 years and has 
a market value of US$446 million, a leverage ratio of 0.73, a ratio of capital expenditures to total assets 
of 0.41, and an industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA) of -0.17. The mean proportion of firms 
reporting loss in the fiscal year prior to the offering is 37%. In general, 36% of IPOs are underwritten 
by reputable investment banks, 92% are audited by big six accounting firms, and 51% are venture-
backed. Firm-specific characteristics also appear to differ between rated and unrated IPOs. The mean 
differences are strongly statistically significant for all firm characteristics except for capital 
expenditures. Rated firms, on average, are older (37 years of age), larger (market value of US$1,252 
million), more leveraged (leverage ratio of 96%), and more profitable (8% report losses). Moreover, 
rated IPOs are more likely to be taken public by prestigious underwriters (68% of firms) and audited 
by big six auditors (96% of firms), but are less likely to seek venture capital backing (18% of firms). 
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Our results are consistent with prior literature. For instance, Denis and Mihov (2003) and Faulkender 
and Petersen (2006) also report that large, mature, profitable, and highly leveraged companies are more 
likely to issue public debts and obtain credit ratings.  
 
[Please insert Table 2 about here] 
 
With respect to EM proxies, we rely on the median for statistical inference as the median is less 
likely than the mean to be affected by extreme observations. For the whole sample of IPO firms, the 
median abnormal accruals (0.02) are significantly positive. In line with previous studies, we find 
evidence that IPO firms engage in accrual-based EM around IPOs to report higher earnings. The 
median abnormal cash flow from operations (0.03) is also significantly positive, implying that IPO 
firms tend to manipulate sales to bias earnings upward. Meanwhile, the median values of abnormal 
production costs (-0.08), abnormal discretionary expenses (-0.25), and the two aggregate real EM 
proxies REM1 (-0.30) and REM2 (-0.21) are all significantly negative. The preliminary evidence that 
IPO firms engage in income-increasing real EM through sales manipulation but not through 
overproduction and discretionary expenses is intuitive. First, sales manipulation is less likely to be 
discovered given that newly listed firms are expected to have growth in sales. Moreover, increasing 
sales while at the same time reducing discretionary expenses such as advertising and selling, general 
and administrative (SG&A) expenses is not only difficult to accomplish but also likely to attract 
attention and scrutiny from auditors, regulators, and investors. In addition, production cost 
manipulation can only be fully employed by manufacturing firms (Roychowdhury 2006). Our sample 
consists of a small proportion of manufacturing firms; thus, the inability to fully exploit production-
based real EM may deter IPO firms from undertaking this method to manage earnings upward.  
Similarly, unrated firms have significantly positive median abnormal accruals (0.03) and 
abnormal cash flow from operations (0.03), yet have significantly negative median abnormal 
production costs (-0.09), abnormal discretionary expenses (-0.29), REM1 (-0.40), and REM2 (-0.24). 
This indicates that unrated firms tend to engage in income-increasing EM through accruals and sales 
manipulation, yet they make conservative operating decisions related to production and discretionary 
expenses. On the other hand, for rated firms, all EM measures apart from REM1 are not significantly 
different from zero. This suggests that rated issuers do not appear to engage in EM by manipulating 
accruals, sales, production, or discretionary expenses. The tests of the differences in the medians of 
EM proxies between the two samples show significant results and suggest that rated issuers are less 
likely to engage in accrual-based and real EM in the listing year than unrated issuers.  
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The results so far show an initial insight into the relation between credit ratings and EM. Overall, 
unrated firms exhibit income-increasing EM through accruals and sales manipulation; on the other 
hand, rated firms are not involved in either accrual-based or real EM in the issue year. Comparing the 
samples of rated and unrated firms, the results reveal that rated IPOs exhibit lower EM through both 
accruals and real activities than their unrated counterparts. In order to establish more concrete 
evidence, in the next section we provide multivariate analyses controlling for several determinants of 
EM.  
 
3.2. Methodology 
We employ the modified Jones (1991) model described in Dechow et al. (1995) to estimate 
abnormal accruals as a proxy for accrual-based EM.4 In order to mitigate the correlation between 
estimated abnormal accruals and firm performance, we follow the performance matching procedure of 
Kothari et al. (2005). The abnormal accruals of IPO firms are adjusted for those of performance-
matched non-IPO peers. The performance matching is based on year, industry, and ROA. The 
methodology of measuring accrual-based EM is described in more detail in Appendix B.  
For real EM, we follow Roychowdhury (2006) to analyse three real EM tools that managers may 
employ to bias earnings: sales manipulation, overproduction, and discretionary expenses reduction. 
Temporarily boosting sales through price discounts or lenient credit terms will lead to unusually lower 
cash flow from operations. Overproduction to lower cost of goods sold and improve margins will result 
in unusually higher production costs. Cutting advertising, R&D, and SG&A expenses to increase 
earnings will cause unusually lower discretionary expenses. Therefore, firms that engage in these real 
EM activities to overstate earnings tend to have lower abnormal cash flow from operations, higher 
abnormal production costs, and lower abnormal discretionary expenses. The normal levels of cash 
flow from operations, production costs, and discretionary expenses are estimated based on models 
developed by Dechow et al. (1998). The abnormal levels are the actual amount deviated from the 
estimated normal levels. We also adjust the real EM measures of IPO firms for those of performance-
matched non-IPO firms. In order for our real EM measures to have a similar interpretation to our 
accrual-based EM measure, we multiply the computed measures of abnormal cash flow from 
operations and abnormal discretionary expenses by minus one so that higher values indicate higher 
real EM. We also compute two aggregate measures to account for the total effect of real EM: REM1 
                                                          
4 As EM is unobservable and its measurement is largely dependent on the model used, for robustness check, we implement another 
accruals model by Dechow and Dichev (2002) to estimate abnormal accruals. Details of this methodology are explained in Appendix 
B. Our results (untabulated) are consistent with those obtained using the performance-matched modified Jones (1991) model.  
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represents the combined effects of earnings manipulation through production costs and discretionary 
expenses, while REM2 represents the combined effects of earnings manipulation through sales and 
discretionary expenses. Similarly, higher values suggest more income-enhancing real EM. Details of 
our real EM estimation methodology are presented in Appendix B. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL MODELS 
 
4.1. Credit ratings and earnings management around IPOs 
We estimate the following regression model to examine the association between credit ratings 
and EM around IPOs: 
𝐸𝑀𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)𝑖 +
𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑖𝑔6 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 +
𝛽8𝑉𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽
2011
1991 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖  (1) 
where 𝐸𝑀𝑖 is the positive value of an EM measure including abnormal accruals, abnormal cash flow 
from operations, abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary expenses, REM1, and REM2 in 
the fiscal year of the offering. 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 is our main variable of interest that equals to one if 
the firm has a credit rating, and zero otherwise. We include the control variables in Equation (1) as 
suggested by prior EM literature. Definitions of all variables are presented in Appendix A.  
We account for several firm characteristics that may determine the level of EM undertaken in 
the issue year. First of all, we include log(1+ firm age) to control for firm age. Firms with long-standing 
establishment tend to develop more solid management and accounting systems. On the other hand, 
younger companies often exhibit poor financial performance and less stable earnings; thus, they have 
more incentives to manipulate earnings. We also control for firm size by including ln(market value). 
Larger firms have greater operation scales and more complex financial structures, which make it easier 
for managers to exploit accounting policies and operating decisions to manage earnings. However, 
they face closer scrutiny from regulators and capital market players, which may discourage managers 
from becoming involved in dishonest activities (Lee and Masulis 2011).  
Moreover, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Franz et al. (2014) suggest that firms with high 
leverage are more likely to manipulate accruals to avoid debt covenant violation. Hence, we include 
leverage to control for the possibility that highly leveraged firms tend to overstate earnings. 
Additionally, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999) posit that firms engage in EM 
to exceed the positive profit threshold. Thus, we include loss to account for the probability of higher 
income-increasing EM among firms operating at a loss.  
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Furthermore, prior studies document that financial intermediaries participating in the IPO 
process can contribute to curtailing EM. Lee and Masulis (2011) report a negative association between 
underwriter reputation and EM by IPO issuers. Therefore, we include highly ranked underwriter to 
control for this effect of top-tier underwriters. We also add big6 auditor to capture the capability of 
experienced auditing firms in detecting misrepresentations in financial reports as suggested by Becker 
et al. (1998), Krishnan (2003), and Gul et al. (2009). Moreover, we include venture capitalist as venture 
capitalists can play a monitoring role and restrain EM around IPOs (Morsfield and Tan 2006; Lee and 
Masulis 2011; Hochberg 2012; Wongsunwai 2013). 
In addition, investors face higher uncertainty in evaluating high-growth firms as the firm value 
is substantially derived from future uncertain growth opportunities. Therefore, managers of these firms 
have better chances to mislead investors through earnings manipulation (Fan 2007). We use the 
average capital expenditures in the offering year and one year after scaled by total assets at the 
beginning of the offering year, CAPEX, as a proxy for growth. We also account for firm performance 
by including industry-adjusted ROA in the regression. 
Our variable of interest is rating existence, which indicates whether the firm has a credit rating 
before the offering. The provision of a credit rating may not be random across firms as they can choose 
to be rated. An issuer’s decision to acquire a credit rating may depend on various firm-specific 
characteristics which make the existence of a rating beneficial to the firm. For instance, Faulkender 
and Petersen (2006) claim that firms that are larger, have been operating for a longer time, and have 
greater profitability, higher leverage, and more tangible assets tend to issue public debts and obtain 
credit ratings. Firm characteristics which induce the firm to issue debts and have a credit rating may 
also determine the firm’s choice to undertake EM. Thus, the potential issues of selection bias and 
endogeneity may result in a biased coefficient estimate of rating existence.  
To address this issue, we follow related literature (Faulkender and Petersen 2006; An and Chan 
2008; Karampatsas et al. 2014) to account for the endogenous selection issue by employing several 
econometric models including Heckman’s (1979) two-step treatment-effect model, the maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE) treatment-effect model, and the two-stage least squares (2SLS)  
instrumental variable (IV) model. These econometric approaches require the estimation of a selection 
model that accounts for factors influencing the firm’s choice to acquire a credit rating. It is important 
to select variables which are correlated with the probability of having a rating in the selection model 
but do not directly explain EM in the outcome model. Therefore, instead of including firm 
characteristics in the selection model, we account for industry characteristics and exclude industry 
fixed effects in our regressions to avoid weak instrument biases and invalid inferences. Faulkender and 
Petersen (2006) argue that firms operating in an industry with a large proportion of public debt issuers 
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tend to have lower information costs because the bond market is already familiar with the industry and 
competitors. Lower information costs also mean that it is more likely for the bank to underwrite a bond 
issue. Therefore, a firm tend to issue public debts and obtain a credit rating if it operates in an industry 
with more rated firms. To control for this effect, we create the variable industry fraction, which is 
calculated as the logarithm of one plus the percentage of firms that have credit ratings in the same 
three-digit SIC industry as the IPO firm in the fiscal year before the offering. Moreover, Johnson 
(1997) and Cantillo and Wright (2000) demonstrate that firms in more profitable and less risky 
industries are more likely to gain access to public debt markets due to their low default probability. 
Hence, we control for the significance of industry profitability and risks in determining the probability 
of a firm holding a credit rating. We measure industry profitability as the median ratio of earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortisation (EBITDA) to total assets of firms in the same 
three-digit SIC industry as the IPO firm in the fiscal year before the offering. Industry risk is computed 
as the standard deviation of the industry’s profitability.  
The Heckman (1979) correction for self-selection bias involves two-step estimation. In the first 
step, we estimate the selection equation using a probit regression of rating existence on industry 
fraction, industry profitability, and industry risk. The self-selection correction term, i.e. the inverse 
Mills ratio, is estimated and added to the outcome Equation (1) and the linear regression is estimated 
as normal. For MLE treatment effect model, the selection and outcome equations are estimated 
simultaneously by the maximum likelihood estimation. This method is more efficient than the two-
step treatment effect model if the error terms in the selection and outcome equations have a bivariate 
normal distribution (An and Chan 2008). For 2SLS IV model, in the first stage, we estimate the 
regression of rating existence on all exogenous variables in the main Equation (1) and the excluded 
instruments, namely, industry fraction, industry profitability, and industry risk. In the second stage, 
the main regression is estimated with the endogenous variable rating existence being replaced by the 
predicted value from the first stage.  
 
4.2.At-issue earnings management and post-issue performance 
We examine the relation between income-increasing EM in the offering year and subsequent 
accounting performance in order to evaluate whether managers of IPO firms exercise their accounting 
discretion to mislead investors or to better inform the market. Subramanyam (1996) documents that 
the positive association between accounting discretion and subsequent operating cash flows indicates 
the informative role of EM in signaling future performance. Using cash flow from operations (CFO) 
as a measure of future performance can avoid the correlation between current accruals and future 
earnings due to accrual reversals; however, CFO lacks timeliness as a performance measure (Dechow 
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1994; Bowen et al. 2008). Another widely used performance measure is return on assets (ROA), which 
is a direct measure of future profitability. ROA is less likely to have the timeliness issue, yet ROA 
tends to be influenced by accrual reversals as the accruals employed in the past may be correlated with 
future accruals and ultimately with ROA (Bowen et al. 2008). Each performance measure has its own 
strengths and weaknesses. In order to provide more robust findings, we employ both measures of 
accounting performance in our analysis.  
We estimate the following regressions to examine the relation between at-issue income-
increasing EM and accounting performance in the subsequent year: 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡=1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡=0 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡=0 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡=0 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡=0 +
𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡=0 + ∑ 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + ∑ 𝛽
2011
1991 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖  (2a) 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡=1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡=0 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡=0 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡=0 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡=0
+ 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡=0 + ∑ 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + ∑ 𝛽
2011
1991
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖 
(2b) 
  
where 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡=1 is cash flow from operations scaled by lagged total assets in the fiscal year following 
the IPO; 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡=1 is net income scaled by lagged total assets in the fiscal year following the IPO; 
𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡=0 is the positive value of an EM measure including abnormal accruals, abnormal cash flow 
from operations, abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary expenses, REM1, and REM2 in 
the offering year; 𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡=0 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡=0 is an interaction term between at-issue EM and the 
presence of a credit rating. We add current performance measures (𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡=0, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡=0) to control for 
potential mean-reversion in the measures of accounting performance (Barber and Lyon 1996; Bowen 
et al. 2008). We also include CAPEX to account for the effect of the investment of proceeds on post-
issue performance (Teoh et al. 1998b).  
If managers manipulate either accruals or operating activities to overstate earnings for 
opportunistic purposes to mislead investors, the earnings will not be sustainable and at-issue income-
increasing EM will not reflect the firm’s future prospects. On the other hand, if managers engage in 
EM with the aim of communicating private information to the market, at-issue EM will be related to 
the firm’s future performance. We expect that managers of rated IPO firms tend to engage in income-
enhancing EM to signal their value; therefore, the sum of the estimated coefficients (𝛽1+𝛽2) will be 
significantly positive.  
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To examine the impact of at-issue income-increasing EM on the post-issue long-run stock 
performance, we regress post-issue three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) on at-issue 
EM. The regression is estimated as follows: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑀𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 +
𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 +
𝛽7𝐿𝑛(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 +
𝛽10𝐵𝑖𝑔6 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽11𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽
2011
1991 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖  (3) 
where 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖  is the firm’s post-issue three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return calculated starting 
from the day after the annual financial report date in the offering year to the earlier of the three-year 
anniversary date or the delisting date; 𝐸𝑀𝑖 is the positive value of an EM measure (abnormal accruals, 
abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary expenses, 
REM1, or REM2) in the offering year. We include control variables in Equation (3) as suggested by 
prior studies (Ritter 1991; Teoh et al. 1998a; Chen et al. 2013). Definitions of these variables are 
presented in Appendix A. The existence of a credit rating reduces the information uncertainty, creating 
incentives for managers of rated firms to release private information to signal firm quality and also 
allowing investors to properly interpret this information and incorporate it into their firm valuation. 
Therefore, price adjustment will occur in the short run, leaving insignificant long-run abnormal stock 
returns. Therefore, we expect that at-issue EM of rated firms will be unrelated to long-run stock 
performance, and the sum of the estimated coefficients (𝛽1 + 𝛽2) will be insignificantly different from 
zero. 
As an additional check, we examine long-run stock performance using the calendar-time 
portfolio approach5: the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, and the Carhart (1997) four-
factor model. The regression model estimated based on the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model 
is as follows: 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐸𝑀𝑝𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑀𝑝𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑚𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 (4) 
where 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐸𝑀𝑝𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑀𝑝𝑡 is the return from taking a long position in a portfolio of IPO firms that 
manage earnings upward and a short position in a portfolio of IPO firms that manage earnings 
downward for each calendar month in the sample period. 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 is the excess monthly return on the 
                                                          
5 Buy-and-hold returns are representative of investors’ investment experience; therefore, they are commonly used to examine long-run 
stock performance. However, Fama (1998) points out several concerns regarding the use of buy-and-hold returns in long-run 
performance studies including the exaggeration of short-term estimation errors through compounding, the skewness in the distribution 
of buy-and-hold returns, and the cross-correlation problems caused by time-period overlap. Fama (1998) also advocates the use of the 
calendar-time approach to examine the long-run performance as the approach can account for the clustering of events and cross-
correlation problems and better approximate the normal distribution, hence, produce more reliable statistical inferences. 
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value-weighted CRSP index for each calendar month in the sample period. 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is the difference in 
the returns of value-weighted portfolios of small and large stocks for each calendar month in the sample 
period. 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the difference in the returns of value-weighted portfolios of high book-to-market and 
low book-to-market stocks for each calendar month in the sample period. The IPO firm’s returns are 
included in the portfolio returns for the period of three years after the IPO fiscal year end. The Carhart 
four-factor model adds to the Fama and French three-factor model an additional factor to account for 
one-year momentum price return. The factors for those models are retrieved from Professor Kenneth 
French’s website6. The regression is estimated for separate samples of unrated and rated IPO firms. 
The intercept of the factor model represents the average monthly abnormal return. Following Chen 
(2013), we use an intercept test to examine the difference in post-IPO stock performance between 
issuers with aggressive EM and those with conservative EM. In the case that the provision of a credit 
rating reduces information asymmetry and allows investors to better gauge the managerial intention in 
EM and adjust accordingly, the future stock returns will be unrelated to EM in the offering year. 
Therefore, we expect that the intercept of the regression estimated for the sample of rated IPO firms is 
insignificantly different from zero. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
5.1. Credit ratings and earnings management around IPOs 
Table 3 reports our regression analyses of the association between accrual-based EM and rating 
existence using the three estimation methods: Heckman’s two-step treatment effect model, MLE 
treatment effect model, and 2SLS IV model.  
 
[Please insert Table 3 about here] 
 
The evidence from the three estimation approaches confirms the presence of the endogenous 
selection problem. The inverse Mills ratio from the Heckman two-step treatment effect model is 
significant at the 5% level, suggesting the issue of selection bias. The likelihood ratio test of the 
correlation between the two error terms of the selection and outcome equations from the MLE 
treatment effect model provides a strongly significant result. This indicates that unobservable firm 
characteristics determining the decision to obtain a credit rating also influence EM activities. The 
                                                          
6 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity from the 2SLS IV model also verifies the endogeneity 
problem.  
The coefficients on rating existence are negative and statistically significant at either 1% or 5% 
levels, suggesting that rated firms are less likely to engage in income-increasing EM. The signs of the 
coefficients on control variables are generally in line with prior literature. We document that IPOs with 
a longer operating history, lower leverage, less growth, and venture-backing are less likely to manage 
earnings. Among the three industry characteristic variables in the selection equation, industry fraction 
is positively associated with rating existence across all specifications. This is similar to the findings of 
earlier studies that the probability of having a credit rating increases for firms in industries with more 
rated debt issuers.  
Table 4 presents multiple regression analyses of different measures of real activities 
manipulation on rating existence. The results of the inverse Mills ratio test, the likelihood ratio test, 
and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test confirm the endogenous selection problem. Panels A, B, and C 
report the results of regressions estimated using the three econometric techniques: Heckman two-step 
treatment effect model, MLE treatment effect model, and 2SLS IV model, respectively.  
 
[Please insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Our results consistently hold for alternative econometric models and different measures of real 
EM. The coefficients on all individual metrics of real EM—abnormal cash flow from operations, 
abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary expenses, and the combined real EM measures 
REM1 and REM2—are significantly negative. This supports the conjecture that rated IPOs are less 
likely to manage earnings through real activities manipulation. The control variables have the expected 
signs. We document significant lower real EM for IPO firms that are older, more profitable, 
underwritten by reputable investment banks, venture-backed, and have lower leverage and less growth. 
Industry fraction is again consistently highly significant across all specifications. Overall, the results 
support our first hypothesis that rated IPO firms demonstrate less income-enhancing accrual-based and 
real EM in the issue year than unrated IPO firms.  
 
5.2. At-issue earnings management and post-issue performance 
We present our results of the analyses of at-issue income-increasing EM and post-issue 
accounting performance measured by future CFO and ROA in Table 5. Panel A shows the regressions 
with CFO as a dependent variable. The coefficients on abnormal accruals, abnormal cash flow from 
operations, abnormal production costs, REM1, and REM2 are insignificant. This suggests that 
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managers of unrated IPO firms tend to engage in income-increasing EM in the offering year without 
the aim of informing the market about the firm’s future performance. The coefficients on the 
interaction term EM*Rating existence are significantly positive at either the 1% or 5% level for all EM 
measures. Moreover, the sums of the estimated coefficients of EM and EM*Rating existence are 
significantly positive, indicating that the level of income-increasing EM in the issue year is positively 
related to the subsequent accounting performance for rated issuers.  
 
[Please insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Panel B presents regressions using ROA as a measure of accounting performance. For unrated 
issuers, future earnings are more likely to worsen with the extent of income-increasing EM in the issue 
year, while for rated issuers, the extent of income-increasing EM during the IPO year is positively 
linked to subsequent future earnings. For robustness, we check our results using the industry-adjusted 
CFO and ROA as well as the average CFO and ROA over the three years after the IPO. We obtain 
similar evidence (untabulated) suggesting the informative purposes of rated IPO firms in employing 
their accounting discretion in the offering year. Overall, the findings support our second hypothesis 
that at-issue income-increasing EM is positively associated with subsequent accounting performance 
for rated IPO firms. This is consistent with our notion that managers of rated IPO firms exercise their 
accounting and operating discretion to better inform the market.  
We report the analyses of the post-issue long-run stock performance in Table 6. Panel A presents 
the regressions of post-issue three-year BHARs on at-issue income-increasing EM. The coefficients 
on abnormal accruals, abnormal cash flow from operations, and abnormal production costs are 
significantly negative. This suggests that managers of unrated IPO firms generally manipulate earnings 
through accruals, sales, and production for opportunistic purposes to mislead investors. In a high-
information-asymmetry environment, investors are less likely to recognise managers’ manipulation 
activities; hence, when actual earnings in the future do not meet their expectation, they revise their 
valuation downward, resulting in negative abnormal stock returns in the post-issue period. The 
insignificance of the F-tests of [EM + EM*Rating existence = 0] across all specifications indicates that 
for rated IPO firms, post-issue long-run stock performance is generally unrelated to the extent of 
income-increasing EM in the offering year.  
 
[Please insert Table 6 about here] 
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Panel C presents the analyses of the Fama and French three-factor model and the Carhart four-
factor model. The results are consistent for both models. The intercept estimates of the regressions 
using abnormal accruals and abnormal cash flow from operations to measure EM are negative and 
significant for the sample of unrated IPOs. This indicates that unrated issuers who aggressively employ 
accrual-based and sales-based EM underperform those who conservatively undertake these EM tools. 
However, for the sample of rated IPOs, the intercept estimates are insignificantly different from zero 
across all specifications apart from the one using abnormal production costs as an EM proxy. Thus, 
for rated issuers, the difference in post-issue long-run abnormal stock returns is not significant between 
aggressive and conservative issuers. 
The results from the analysis of long-term stock performance using BHARs and factors models 
support our third hypothesis that post-issue long-run stock performance is unrelated to at-issue income-
increasing EM for rated issuers. This is consistent with our conjecture that lower information 
asymmetry due to the provision of a credit rating allows investors to more accurately interpret the 
information conveyed by managers through EM and incorporate it into their firm valuation, resulting 
in insignificant long-run abnormal stock returns.  
 
6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
6.1. Interaction effects of credit rating agencies and other financial intermediaries 
Auditors, venture capitalists, and investment banks are financial intermediaries that are closely 
involved in the IPO process. Several studies indicate the constraining effects of these intermediaries 
on EM by IPO firms. Venkataraman et al. (2008) report that auditors are more conservative in auditing 
IPO firms’ financial reports due to greater litigation exposure in the IPO market. Morsfield and Tan 
(2006), Hochberg (2012), and Wongsunwai (2013) suggest that the monitoring by venture capitalists 
inhibits EM by IPO firms. Jo et al. (2007) argue that due to reputational concerns and litigation risks, 
prestigious underwriters make an effort to constrain EM. Lee and Masulis (2011) also document a 
negative association between EM and more reputable venture capitalists and investment banks. In the 
main analysis, we find that CRAs reduce EM by IPO issuers. In this section, we control for the 
interaction effects of CRAs and major financial intermediaries taking part in the IPO process. 
Specifically, we examine whether CRAs exert influence on EM decisions by IPO firms which are 
venture-backed, underwritten by reputable investment banks, or audited by big six accounting firms. 
We create interaction terms between rating existence and each of the variables venture capitalist, 
highly ranked underwriter, and big6 auditor. We then run regressions separately for each interaction 
effect. The results are presented in Table 7.  
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[Please insert Table 7 about here] 
 
Panel A reports the results of the regressions of EM on rating existence controlling for the 
interaction effect between CRAs and venture capitalists. The coefficients on rating existence remain 
significantly negative, indicating that without the involvement of a venture capitalist, CRAs still 
significantly reduce EM. The F-tests of [Rating existence + Rating existence*Venture capitalist] give 
significant negative results in regressions with abnormal accruals, abnormal cash flow from 
operations, and REM2 as dependent variables. This suggests that when a venture capitalist is present, 
rated issuers have significantly lower levels of accrual-based EM, sales-based real EM, and the 
combination of sales and discretionary expense manipulation.  
The results presented in Panel B account for the interaction effect between CRAs and top-tier 
underwriters. The coefficient on rating existence is significantly negative only for the regression with 
the dependent variable of abnormal accruals. This indicates that without a reputable underwriter, 
having a CRA is associated with lower accrual-based EM, but not with lower real EM. Moreover, we 
obtain significant negative results for the F-tests of [Rating existence + Rating existence*Highly 
ranked underwriter] for specifications using abnormal accruals, abnormal cash flow from operations, 
abnormal discretionary expenses, and REM2 as EM measures. This shows that among IPO firms 
having a prestigious underwriter, rated ones have significantly lower EM through accruals, sales, and 
discretionary expenses. 
Panel C illustrates the results of the regressions controlling for the interaction effect between 
CRAs and big six auditing firms. The presence of a CRA is significantly related to lower accrual-based 
and real EM only for firms being audited by a big six accounting firm. This implies that the certification 
of financial statements by an experienced auditing firm is important for a CRA to effectively exert its 
influence on EM by an IPO firm.  
 
6.2. Other robustness tests 
The results so far indicate that managers in rated firms are less likely to manipulate either 
accruals or real activities to distort reported earnings. We further examine whether credit rating levels 
can explain the extent of EM in the IPO year. We create the variable rating level which takes the value 
from 1 to 22, which is equivalent to the lowest rating D to the highest rating AAA. A higher rating 
corresponds to a higher value. We regress different EM proxies on rating level and other controls for 
determinants of EM as previously discussed in Section 4.1. The model is similar to Equation (1) with 
the variable Rating existence being changed to Rating level. The variable Industry fraction in the 
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selection equation is replaced by Industry level, which is the median credit rating level of rated firms 
in the same three-digit SIC industry as the IPO firm. In untabulated results, we do not find significant 
association between credit rating levels and EM around IPOs. Thus, what matters in influencing EM 
by IPO firms are the presence of CRAs and the existence of a credit rating, not the rating per se.7  
In addition, the credit rating sector is highly concentrated with the three largest CRAs (i.e. 
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Service, and Fitch Inc.) covering approximately 95% of the 
rating business. For robustness, we expand our sample of rated IPOs to include firms obtaining ratings 
from either of the three CRAs. The data for long-term corporate credit ratings from Moody’s Investors 
Service and Fitch Inc. are extracted from Bloomberg. This increases our sample of rated IPOs to 174 
firms with 47 firms having credit ratings from more than one rating agency. The findings (untabulated) 
also show that rated firms are less likely to engage in accrual-based and real EM.  
Furthermore, concerns have been raised regarding the ability of CRAs to give advance warning 
of financial crises. For example, during the Internet bubble period, S&P and Moody’s assigned 
investment grade ratings to Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat just a short period before they went 
bankrupt8 . In July 2007, the U.S. market witnessed a mass significant downgrade by CRAs for 
thousands of residential mortgage-backed securities that were issued a year earlier. Thus, we add 
additional controls for these turbulent periods, specifically, the dot-com bubble period of 1999–2000 
and the financial crisis of 2007–2008. Another important event that may affect our results is the 
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). SOX was passed by the U.S. Congress and enacted in 2002 
as a reaction to a series of corporate scandals including those affecting Enron and WorldCom. The bill 
aims to restore investor confidence in financial reporting and assure the integrity of capital markets. It 
entails a number of strict regulations to strengthen financial disclosures and protect investors from 
potential fraudulent accounting practices. Lobo and Zhou (2006) report that SOX requirement for the 
certification of financial statements by CEOs and CFOs influences managerial accounting discretion 
towards higher conservatism in financial reporting. Cohen et al. (2008) also document changes in 
                                                          
7 As an additional check, we create an indicator variable that equals to one if the credit rating is investment-grade (BBB- and above) and 
test whether EM is different among firms with investment-grade credit ratings. We find that credit rating investment grades do not 
explain the variation in EM by IPO issuers. Moreover, as the majority (96%) of firms in our sample have non-investment-grade credit 
ratings (BB+ and below) and the rating levels cluster in the range of 7 to 12 (equivalent to B- to BB+), we also check our results on the 
sample of IPO firms whose rating levels range from 7 to 12 and obtain similar results. 
 
8 During the Internet bubble period, S&P and Moody’s assigned investment-grade ratings to Enron until November 27, 2001—six days 
before its bankruptcy. Moody’s and S&P gave WorldCom investment-grade ratings about two months before its bankruptcy. Parmalat 
also received an investment-grade rating from S&P until 18 days before its bankruptcy on December 27, 2003 (Coffee 2006). 
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managerial choices of EM methods towards more real EM after the passage of SOX. Thus, we include 
a dummy variable indicating IPOs occurring after the passage of SOX. Controlling for the dot-com, 
crisis, and post-SOX periods, we obtain consistent results (untabulated) with the main analysis. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
This study provides new empirical evidence of the impact of credit ratings on accrual-based and 
real EM around IPOs. We find a negative association between rating existence and income-increasing 
accrual-based and real EM in the offering year. Rating levels, however, are not significantly related to 
at-issue EM. This suggests the importance of rating existence and CRAs in restraining EM by IPO 
issuers. The provision of a credit rating reduces information asymmetry around IPOs, thereby making 
it more likely for EM to be detected. Moreover, CRAs are highly capable of identifying managers’ 
misbehaviours due to their profound expertise, experience, and access to a large pool of both private 
and public information. Reputational concerns and litigation risks also strengthen CRAs’ incentives to 
thoroughly monitor issuers and detect their reporting misrepresentations. Thus, the monitoring by 
CRAs and lower information asymmetry due to the provision of a credit rating disincentivise rated 
firms from manipulating reported earnings through accrual and real activities. The participation of 
financial intermediaries engaging in the IPO process including venture capitalists, underwriters and 
auditors is also important for CRAs to effectively restrain EM. When a venture capitalist is not 
involved, CRAs still significantly reduce both accrual-based and real EM. However, without a 
prestigious underwriter, having a CRA is associated with lower accrual-based EM, but not with lower 
real EM. Particularly, the presence of a reputable auditor is essential for CRAs to significantly exert 
their influence on both accrual-based and real EM. Our main results are robust when we use ratings 
data from S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch to determine the existence of a credit rating. The findings also 
remain consistent when controlling for critical periods that may affect the influence of CRAs on EM 
including the Internet bubble (1999–2000), the financial crisis (2007–2008), and the post-Sarbanes 
Oxley Act (2002).  
Furthermore, we examine the influence of rating existence on managerial intent to exercise 
accounting and operating discretion to inflate earnings in the IPO year. For unrated issuers, the at-issue 
income-increasing EM is not related to future earnings. However, for rated issuers, the income-
increasing EM in the offering year is positively linked to subsequent accounting performance. In 
addition, analysing post-issue long-run stock performance, we reveal that at-issue income-increasing 
EM is negatively related to post-issue long-run stock returns for unrated firms, while the relationship 
is insignificant for rated firms. The findings suggest that unrated issuers tend to opportunistically 
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manage earnings around IPOs and investors are unable to see through this behaviour. On the contrary, 
rated issuers are more likely to employ their discretion in accounting and operating decisions to convey 
the firm’s future prospects to the market. Overall, our study uncovers the significance of rating 
existence in explaining the extent of income-increasing EM around IPOs and managers’ purposes in 
utilising their accounting and operating discretion to report higher financial outcomes.   
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Appendix A: Variable definition 
Variable Definition 
Measures of earnings management 
Abnormal accruals  Abnormal accruals computed using the modified Jones (1991) model and 
adjusted for abnormal accruals of a performance-matched non-IPO firm 
following Kothari et al. (2005). Details of the methodology are described in 
Appendix B. 
Abnormal cash flow from operations Abnormal cash flow from operations estimated using the model developed 
by Dechow et al. (1998) and implemented by Roychowdhury (2006). The 
value is multiplied by minus one. Details of the methodology are described 
in Appendix B. 
Abnormal production costs Abnormal production costs estimated using the model developed by 
Dechow et al. (1998) and implemented by Roychowdhury (2006). Details 
of the methodology are described in Appendix B. 
Abnormal discretionary expenses Abnormal discretionary expenses estimated using the model developed by 
Dechow et al. (1998) and implemented by Roychowdhury (2006). The 
value is multiplied by minus one. Details of the methodology are described 
in Appendix B.  
REM1 Aggregate level of real earnings management computed as the total of 
abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses.  
 
REM2 Aggregate level of real earnings management computed as the total of 
abnormal cash flow from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses. 
Credit rating variables 
Rating existence Indicator variable that equals to one if the firm has a credit rating one month 
prior to the offering, and zero otherwise. 
Rating level Credit rating level that ranges from 1 (D rating) to 22 (AAA rating). 
Firm and offering characteristics 
Firm age Age of the firm in years. Firm age is the difference between the firm’s 
offering year and its founding year. Company founding years are collected 
from the Field-Ritter dataset.9 
Market value Market value of the firm at the time of the listing.  
Leverage Ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  
Loss Indicator variable that equals to one if the firm has negative earnings before 
interest and taxes in the fiscal year prior to the offering, and zero otherwise.  
CAPEX Average capital expenditures in the offering year and one year after scaled 
by total assets at the beginning of the offering year. 
ROA Ratio of net income to total assets. 
CFO Ratio of cash flow from operations to total assets. 
Industry-adjusted ROA Industry-adjusted ROA that is calculated by subtracting the median ROA 
of the two-digit SIC industry group from the firm’s ROA.  
                                                          
9 The Field-Ritter dataset is available on Jay Ritter’s webpage: http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/FoundingDates.htm. 
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Big6 auditor Indicator variable that equals to one if the firm is audited by a big six 
accounting firm, and zero otherwise. Big six accounting firms include 
Arthur Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand, Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, 
KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers.10 
Venture capitalist Indicator variable that equals to one if the firm is venture backed, and zero 
otherwise. 
Highly ranked underwriter Indicator variable that equals to one if the firm is underwritten by reputable 
underwriters, and zero otherwise. Reputable underwriters are those with a 
ranking score of 9.0 or above based on Jay Ritter’s underwriter rankings.11 
Book-to-market Ratio of book value to market value at the end of the fiscal year of the 
offering. 
High-tech industry  Indicator variable that equals to one if the firm is in the high-tech industry, 
and zero otherwise. 
Stock returns variables  
Underpricing Initial returns on the first trading day.  
BHAR Post-issue three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return that is calculated 
starting from the day after the annual financial report in the offering year 
to the earlier of the three year anniversary date and the delisting date. 
Market BHR Three-year buy-and-hold value weighted market index return. 
POSEM  Monthly return of the portfolio of IPO firms that undertake income-
increasing EM in the offering year. 
NEGEM Monthly return of the portfolio of IPO firms that undertake income-
decreasing EM in the offering year. 
MKT Excess monthly return on the value-weighted CRSP index. 
SMB Difference in the monthly returns of value-weighted portfolios of small and 
large stocks. 
HML Difference in the monthly returns of value-weighted portfolios of high 
book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks. 
Instrumental variables 
Industry fraction Logarithm of one plus the percentage of firms having credit ratings in the 
same three-digit SIC industry as the IPO firm. 
Industry level Median credit rating level of firms having credit ratings in the same three-
digit SIC industry as the IPO firm. 
Industry profitability Median ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) to total assets of firms in the same three-digit SIC 
industry as the IPO firm. 
Industry risk Standard deviation of the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets of firms in the same 
three-digit SIC industry as the IPO firm. 
                                                          
10 Coopers & Lybrand merged with Pricewaterhouse on July 1, 1998. Arthur Andersen ceased to operate after Enron scandal in 2002.  
11 IPO underwriter reputation rankings are available on Jay Ritter’s webpage: http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. 
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Appendix B: Earnings management estimation models 
I. Accrual-based earnings management 
In measuring our estimate of abnormal accruals, we use the modified Jones (1991) model 
described in Dechow et al. (1995). Jones (1991) assumes that the change in sales and gross property, 
plant, and equipment (PPE) are two main determinants of the firm’s accruals. Thus, total accruals are 
modelled as a function of sales growth and PPE. The total accruals are disaggregated into two 
components: expected accruals and abnormal accruals. The expected accruals reflect the firm’s 
economic conditions and are predicted by the change in sales and PPE. The abnormal accruals reflect 
managerial discretion and are determined by the residuals. However, sales revenues are susceptible to 
managerial manipulation as managers can influence credit policies to induce sales. Therefore, Dechow 
et al. (1995) enhance the power of the Jones model by deducting accounts receivable growth from 
revenue growth to account for the possibility of management manipulation in credit sales.  
In applying the modified Jones model, we first estimate for each year the following Jones model 
cross-sectionally for all firms in the same two-digit SIC industry as the IPO firm yet excluding firms 
going public in three years’ time: 
 
(B1) 
where TACCi,t is total accruals computed as earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations less cash flow from operations; TAi.t-1 is lagged total assets; ∆SALESi,t is the change in total 
sales from the fiscal year before the offering to the fiscal year of the IPO; and PPEi,t is the gross value 
of property, plant, and equipment. We use the cash flow method instead of the balance sheet approach 
to measure total accruals, as Hribar and Collins (2002) show that measuring accruals directly from the 
statement of cash flows is a superior method to avoid the non-articulation problem of the balance sheet 
approach. All variables are winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentile level to mitigate the influence of 
outliers. We require at least 10 firms in an industry in a year to run the regressions. This cross-sectional 
approach, which is introduced by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), helps control for changes in 
economic conditions for specific years and industries that may influence total accruals independent of 
any managerial manipulation. The coefficient estimates from Equation (B1) are then used to estimate 
the expected component of total accruals (NACCi.t) for the IPO sample as follows:  
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where ∆RECi.t is the change in receivables from the fiscal year before the offering to the fiscal year of 
the IPO. The abnormal accruals (DACCi.t) are computed as the difference between total accruals and 
expected accruals:  
 
(B3) 
Several studies raise the concerns that the abnormal accruals measured using the Jones model 
are correlated with firm performance; therefore, the Jones model is mis-specified when being applied 
to firms experiencing extreme performance (Dechow et al. 1995). To mitigate this problem, we apply 
the procedure suggested by Kothari et al. (2005) to match abnormal accruals of the IPO firm to those 
of a non-IPO counterpart in the same two-digit SIC industry and year with the closest prior-year ROA. 
We exclude firms whose matched non-IPO firm has ROA outside the range of +/- 10% of the IPO 
firm’s ROA. The matched firm’s abnormal accruals are deducted from the IPO firm’s abnormal 
accruals to yield the performance-matched abnormal accruals for the IPO firm. 
We also acknowledge that accruals models may not adequately isolate between abnormal and 
normal accruals; as a result, estimated abnormal accruals may capture normal components of accruals. 
However, it should be noted that we use abnormal accruals as a dependent variable. The effect of 
measurement error on the dependent variable is less severe than on the independent variable. If our 
estimate of abnormal accruals suffers from measurement error, the consequences will be lower 
explanatory power (R2) of the model but unbiased estimated coefficients, larger estimated standard 
errors, and hence wider confidence intervals. 
For robustness check, we employ another commonly used model by Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
to measure abnormal accruals. Dechow and Dichev (2002) map short-term working capital accruals to 
present, past, and future cash flows based on the notion that accruals predict future cash receipt or 
payment. Their model does not address distortions caused by long-term accruals; therefore, we follow 
McNichols (2002) and Francis et al. (2005) to modify the model by adding growth in revenue and PPE 
to reflect performance and depreciation. We estimate the following regression cross-sectionally for 
each year and for all non-IPO firms in each two-digit SIC industry with at least 10 firms:  
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where TCAi,t is total current working capital accruals; CFOi,t is cash flow from operations; TAi,t-1 is 
lagged total assets; ∆SALESi,t is the change in sales; PPEi,t is the gross value of plant, property, and 
equipment; ∆CAi,t is the change in current assets; ∆Cashi,t is the change in cash; ∆CLi,t is the change 
in current liabilities; ∆STDi,t is the change in short-term debt; NIBEi,t is net income before extraordinary 
items; and DEPNi,t is depreciation and amortisation expenses. All changes are from the fiscal year 
before the offering to the fiscal year of the IPO. We winsorise all variables at the 1 and 99 percentile 
level to moderate the effect of outliers. The estimated coefficients of Equation (B4) are used to estimate 
the normal level of current accruals of IPO firms. The IPO firms’ abnormal current accruals are then 
computed as the difference between the firms’ actual total current accruals and their normal level of 
current accruals. 
 
II. Real earnings management 
We measure our real EM proxies based on models developed by Dechow et al. (1998) and 
implemented by Roychowdhury (2006). Roychowdhury (2006) documents that managers avoid 
reporting annual earnings losses by manipulating real activities including temporarily increasing sales 
through price discounts or more lenient credit terms, overproducing to decrease the cost of goods sold, 
and reducing discretionary expenditures. Therefore, if managers exercise their discretion in operating 
decisions related to sales, production, and discretionary expenses to boost earnings, firms will exhibit 
unusually low levels of cash flow from operations and discretionary expenses, and unusually high 
production costs. We use three metrics as proxies for real EM: abnormal cash flow from operations, 
abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses. 
The normal level of cash flow from operations is expressed as a linear function of sales and 
change in sales in the current period:  
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(B5) 
where CFOi,t is cash flows from operations, TAi,t-1 is lagged total assets, SALESi,t is total sales, 
∆SALESi,t is the change in sales from the fiscal year before the issue to the fiscal year of the IPO. 
The model for normal production costs is estimated as a function of current sales, change in 
current sales, and change in past sales: 
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where PRODi,t  is the production costs computed as the sum of the cost of goods sold and the change 
in inventory from the fiscal year before the IPO to the fiscal year of the issue. ∆SALESi,t-1 is the change 
in sales from the fiscal year two years before the issue to the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
The normal discretionary expenses are expressed as a linear function of lagged sales: 
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(B7) 
where DISEXPi,t is the discretionary expenses computed as the sum of SG&A, R&D, and advertising 
expenses. SALESi,t-1 is total sales in the fiscal year prior to the IPO.  
All the three equations (B5), (B6) and (B7) are estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-
year with at least 10 observations. We winsorise all variables at the 1 and 99 percentile level to mitigate 
the issue of outliers. The abnormal level of each real EM proxy is calculated as actual level minus the 
normal level estimated using the coefficients from the regressions (B5), (B6), and (B7). Moreover, we 
match real EM measures of the IPO firms to those of non-IPO peers based on year, industry, and ROA 
to generate performance-matched real EM measures. It is also noted that we multiply the estimated 
abnormal cash flow from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses by minus one so that higher 
values reflect higher real EM. Besides analysing the individual effect of each real EM activity, we also 
measure the aggregate effect of all three metrics by calculating two combined measures REM1 and 
REM2. Following (Cohen and Zarowin (2010)), we compute REM1 as the sum of abnormal production 
costs and abnormal discretionary expenses and REM2 as the sum of abnormal cash flow from 
operations and abnormal discretionary expenses. Abnormal production costs and abnormal cash flows 
from operations are not combined because the same activities that create high abnormal production 
costs also create low abnormal cash flow from operations, so adding the two measures would result in 
double counting (Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen and Zarowin 2010). The higher REM1, the more likely 
that firms increase production and cut discretionary expenses to manipulate earnings upward. 
Similarly, the higher REM2, the more likely that firms manipulate sales and reduce discretionary 
expenses to report higher earnings.  
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Table 1 
IPO distribution by issue year, industry, and credit rating level  
 
Panel A: IPO distribution by issue year 
Year 
 
All IPOs 
(N = 2,602) 
Rated IPOs 
(N = 153) 
Unrated IPOs 
(N = 2,449) 
 N % N % N % 
1991  111 4.01 7 4.38 104 3.98 
1992  185 6.68 9 5.63 176 6.74 
1993  226 8.16 14 8.75 212 8.12 
1994  186 6.71 4 2.50 182 6.97 
1995  214 7.72 9 5.63 205 7.85 
1996  301 10.86 11 6.88 290 11.11 
1997  213 7.69 9 5.63 204 7.81 
1998  140 5.05 6 3.75 134 5.13 
1999  243 8.77 11 6.88 232 8.89 
2000  167 6.03 7 4.38 160 6.13 
2001  35 1.26 2 1.25 33 1.26 
2002  40 1.44 3 1.88 37 1.42 
2003  37 1.34 7 4.38 30 1.15 
2004  95 3.43 10 6.25 85 3.26 
2005  80 2.89 8 5.00 72 2.76 
2006  91 3.28 14 8.75 77 2.95 
2007  99 3.57 5 3.13 94 3.60 
2008  12 0.43 1 0.63 11 0.42 
2009  31 1.12 5 3.13 26 1.00 
2010  52 1.88 10 6.25 42 1.61 
2011  44 1.59 1 0.63 43 1.65 
 
Panel B: IPO distribution by industry 
Industry name SIC codes All IPOs 
 
Rated IPOs 
 
Unrated IPOs 
 
N % N % N % 
Oil and gas  13 48 1.84 6 3.92 42 1.71 
Food products 20 38 1.46 7 4.58 31 1.27 
Chemical products 28 218 8.38 9 5.88 209 8.53 
Manufacturing 30-34 91 3.49 16 10.45 75 3.07 
Computer equipment & services 35, 73 809 31.09 13 8.5 796 32.51 
Electronic equipment 36 242 9.30 8 5.23 234 9.55 
Scientific instruments 38 193 7.42 8 5.23 185 7.55 
Transportation and public utilities 40-49 204 7.83 28 18.29 176 7.18 
Wholesale and retail trade 50-59 312 11.99 25 16.34 287 11.72 
Entertainment services 70, 78, 79 51 1.96 3 1.96 48 1.95 
Health services 80 90 3.46 5 3.27 85 3.47 
All others 
10, 12, 14-17, 21-
27, 29, 37, 39, 72, 
75, 76, 82, 83, 87 
306 11.78 25 16.34 281 11.46 
Total 57 2,602 100 153 100 2,449 100 
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Panel C: IPO distribution by credit rating level  
Credit rating 
level 
Rating level   
All rated IPOs  
(N = 153)  
%   
AAA 22   1 0.65   
AA+ 21   0 0.00   
AA 20   0 0.00   
AA- 19   0 0.00   
A+ 18   0 0.00   
A 17   1 0.65   
A- 16   1 0.65   
BBB+ 15   0 0.00   
BBB 14   2 1.31   
BBB- 13   1 0.65   
BB+ 12   2 1.31   
BB 11   9 5.88   
BB- 10   27 17.65   
B+ 9   66 43.14   
B 8   27 17.65   
B- 7   12 7.84   
CCC+ 6   4 2.61   
CCC 5   0 0.00   
CCC- 4   0 0.00   
CC 3   0 0.00   
C 2   0 0.00   
D 1   0 0.00   
 A rating category 3 1.95   
 B rating category 146 95.43   
 C and D rating category 4 2.61   
 Investment grade (BBB- and above) 6 3.91   
 Non-investment grade (BB+ and below) 147 96.08   
 
Table 1 presents the sample distribution of IPO firms over the period 1991-2011 by issue year (Panel A), by industry (Panel B), and by 
credit rating level (Panel C). Credit rating level is assigned a number from 1 to 22 and a higher rating level takes a higher value. N denotes 
the number of observations. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics  
 
 All IPO firms 
 
Unrated IPO firms 
 
Rated IPO firms 
 
Difference 
in mean  
(p-value) 
Difference 
in median  
(p-value) 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Firm characteristics            
Firm age 2,602 16.08 9.00 2,449 14.78 8.00 153 36.86 24.00 0.000 0.000 
Market value 2,602 445.54 184.23 2,449 395.94 171.38 153 1,252.28 497.43 0.000 0.000 
Leverage 2,602 0.73 0.73 2,449 0.71 0.66 153 0.96 0.89 0.000 0.000 
Loss 2,602 0.37 0.37 2,449 0.39 0.00 153 0.08 0.00 0.000 0.000 
Highly ranked underwriter 2,602 0.36 0.36 2,449 0.34 0.00 153 0.68 1.00 0.000 0.000 
Big6 auditor 2,602 0.92 0.92 2,449 0.92 1.00 153 0.96 1.00 0.032 0.063 
Venture capitalist 2,602 0.51 0.51 2,449 0.53 1.00 153 0.18 0.00 0.000 0.000 
Industry-adjusted ROA 2,602 -0.17 -0.17 2,449 -0.18 -0.00 153 -0.01 -0.01 0.000 0.534 
CAPEX 2,602 0.41 0.41 2,449 0.43 0.14 153 0.12 0.07 0.112 0.000 
Earnings management proxies            
Abnormal accruals 2,324 -0.03** 0.02*** 2,188 -0.03** 0.03*** 136 -0.04 -0.01 0.480 0.060 
Abnormal cash flow from operations 2,354 0.10*** 0.03*** 2,217 0.10*** 0.03*** 137 -0.00 0.02 0.052 0.165 
Abnormal production costs 1,038 -0.11*** -0.08*** 938 -0.12*** -0.09*** 100 -0.01 -0.01 0.107 0.008 
Abnormal discretionary expenses 2,211 -0.65*** -0.25*** 2,088 -0.69*** -0.29*** 123 0.02 0.02 0.000 0.000 
REM1 968 -0.80*** -0.30*** 879 -0.88*** -0.40*** 89 0.06 0.08** 0.000 0.000 
REM2 2,179 -0.56*** -0.21*** 2,059 -0.59*** -0.24*** 120 0.02 0.01 0.000 0.000 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the pooled, unrated, and rated IPO firms over the period 1991-2011. Firm age is the age of the firm in years in the issue year. Market value is the market value 
of the firm at the time of the listing. Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Loss equals to one if the firm has negative earnings before interest and taxes in the fiscal year prior to the 
offering, and zero otherwise. Highly ranked underwriter equals to one if the firm is underwritten by an underwriter which has a ranking score of 9.0 or above according to the underwriter rankings 
retrieved from Jay Ritter’s webpage, and zero otherwise. Big6 auditor equals to one if the firm is audited by a big six accounting firm (i.e., Arthur Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand, Ernst & Young, 
Deloitte & Touche, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers), and zero otherwise. Venture capitalist equals to one if the firm is venture backed, and zero otherwise. Industry-adjusted ROA is the firm’s 
ROA adjusted for the industry’s median ROA. CAPEX is the average capital expenditures in the offering year and one year after scaled by total assets at the beginning of the offering year. Abnormal 
accruals are estimated using the modified Jones (1991) model and adjusted for the abnormal accruals of a performance-matched non-IPO firm following Kothari et al. (2005). Abnormal cash flow from 
operations, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses are estimated using models developed by Dechow et al. (1998) and implemented by Roychowdhury (2006). Abnormal 
cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied by minus one so that accrual-based and real earnings management proxies have the same interpretation. REM1 is the sum 
of abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses, and REM2 is the sum of abnormal cash flow from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses. T-tests and Wilcoxon sign rank 
tests are used to examine the differences of means and medians from zero. Tests of the differences in means and medians between the sub-samples of unrated and rated IPOs are based on t-tests and 
Wilcoxon rank sum tests. One, two and three asterisks denote the statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. N denotes the number of observations.  
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Table 3 
Regressions of accrual-based earnings management on credit rating existence 
 
 
Heckman MLE IV 
 Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome 
Rating existence  -0.650***  -0.283***  -1.207**  
  (-2.79)  (-4.58)  (-2.04)    
Log(1+ firm age)  -0.185***  -0.184*** 0.066*** -0.106*   
  (-5.32)  (-5.18) (2.92) (-1.79)    
Ln(market value)  0.001  0.001 0.044*** 0.050    
   (0.11)  (0.08) (4.39) (1.57)    
Leverage  0.067**  0.063* 0.046*** 0.119**  
   (2.14)  (1.94) (2.67) (2.34)    
Loss  0.074*  0.076* 0.006 0.078    
   (1.95)  (1.72) (0.28) (1.60)    
Highly ranked underwriter  -0.033  -0.036 0.017 -0.014    
   (-1.10)  (-1.16) (0.95) (-0.36)    
Big6 auditor  0.029  0.029 0.008 0.035    
   (0.60)  (0.69) (0.35) (0.72)    
Venture capitalist  -0.056**  -0.049* -0.047*** -0.109**  
   (-2.04)  (-1.85) (-3.93) (-2.54)    
Industry-adjusted ROA  0.002  0.000 0.012 0.015    
  (0.04)  (0.00) (0.67) (0.29)    
CAPEX  0.014***  0.014*** -0.001 0.013*** 
  (4.69)  (3.56) (-1.39) (3.61)    
Intercept -2.183*** 0.381*** -2.217*** 0.357*** -0.284*** 0.066    
 (-15.36) (3.86) (-17.58) (4.03) (-4.71) (0.35)    
Industry fraction 8.235***  8.564***  0.533**  
 (6.01)  (6.86)  (2.31)  
Industry profitability 0.191  0.288  0.045  
 (0.19)  (0.31)  (0.57)  
Industry risk -0.004  -0.003  0.000  
 (-0.28)  (-0.48)  (-1.07)  
       
Inverse Mills ratio 0.265**      
 (2.40)      
Likelihood ratio test against  
H0: ρ = 0  (p-value) 
  
 0.000 
  
    
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
against H0: variables are 
exogenous (p-value) 
     0.018 
Number of observations 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
 
Table 3 presents the regression analyses of the association between abnormal accruals and credit rating existence using three estimation 
approaches: Heckman two-step treatment effect model, maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) treatment effect model, and instrumental 
variable (IV) model. In the selection equation, rating existence is regressed on industry fraction, industry profitability, and industry risk. 
Industry fraction is the logarithm of one plus the percentage of firms having credit ratings in the same three-digit SIC industry as the IPO 
firm. Industry profitability is the median ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets 
of firms in the same three-digit SIC industry as the IPO firm. Industry risk is the standard deviation of the ratio of earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets of firms in the same three-digit SIC industry as the IPO firm. The outcome 
equation is:  
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 +
𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑖𝑔6 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑉𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 +
𝛽10𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽
2011
1991 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖  
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The dependent variable Abnormal accruals are estimated using the modified Jones (1991) model and adjusted for the abnormal accruals 
of a performance-matched non-IPO firm following Kothari et al. (2005). Rating existence equals to one if the firm has a credit rating one 
month prior to the offering, and zero otherwise. Log(1+firm age) is the logarithm of one plus firm age in the offering year. Ln(market 
value) is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market value at the time of the listing. Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
Loss equals to one if the firm has negative earnings before interest and taxes in the fiscal year prior to the offering, and zero otherwise. 
Highly ranked underwriter equals to one if the firm is underwritten by an underwriter which has a ranking score of 9.0 or above according 
to the underwriter rankings retrieved from Jay Ritter’s webpage, and zero otherwise. Big6 auditor equals to one if the firm is audited by 
a big six accounting firm (i.e., Arthur Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand, Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG, and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers), and zero otherwise. Venture capitalist equals to one if the firm is venture backed, and zero otherwise. Industry-
adjusted ROA is the firm’s ROA adjusted for the industry’s median ROA. CAPEX is the average capital expenditures in the offering year 
and one year after scaled by total assets at the beginning of the offering year. All regressions control for year fixed effects whose 
coefficients are suppressed. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The 
test statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 4 
Regressions of real earnings management on credit rating existence 
 
 
Panel A: Heckman’s two-step treatment effect 
 Abnormal cash flow from 
operations  
Abnormal production costs  Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
REM1 REM2 
 Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome 
Rating existence  -0.504**  -0.671**  -0.675***  -0.812**  -0.825*** 
  (-2.38)  (-2.04)  (-2.67)  (-2.01)  (-2.63) 
Log(1 + firm age)  -0.149***  0.056   -0.078  -0.091  -0.045 
  (-3.14)  (0.64)  (-1.48)  (-0.85)  (-0.72) 
Ln(market value)  0.008  -0.053*  0.031  -0.113***  0.029 
   (0.42)  (-1.69)  (1.40)  (-2.66)  (1.10) 
Leverage  0.089**  0.024  0.141**  0.053  0.178*** 
   (2.35)  (0.34)  (2.30)  (0.50)  (2.89) 
Loss  -0.102**  0.090  0.073  0.015  0.013 
   (-2.08)  (1.06)  (1.14)  (0.14)  (0.17) 
Highly ranked underwriter  -0.084**  -0.082  -0.137***  -0.114  -0.151*** 
   (-2.20)  (-1.34)  (-2.76)  (-1.38)  (-2.69) 
Big6 auditor  0.023  0.153  0.069  0.156  -0.024 
   (0.36)  (1.54)  (0.88)  (1.15)  (-0.27) 
Venture capitalist  -0.066*  0.009  -0.035  -0.066  -0.053 
   (-1.76)  (0.12)  (-0.71)  (-0.66)  (-0.94) 
Industry-adjusted ROA  -0.716***  -0.478***  -0.264***  -0.355***  -0.241*** 
  (-17.75)  (-6.07)  (-3.30)  (-2.95)  (-3.75) 
CAPEX  0.018***  0.277***  0.007  0.232*  0.034*** 
  (4.55)  (4.18)  (0.28)  (1.80)  (2.89) 
Intercept -2.248*** 0.311** -1.778*** 0.478 -1.954*** 0.196 -1.515*** 1.261*** -2.004*** 0.262 
 (-17.73) (2.33) (-10.80) (1.59) (-13.06) (1.21) (-8.60) (3.10) (-14.12) (1.44) 
Industry fraction 9.438***  6.732***  9.418***  6.628***  8.839***  
 (7.46)  (3.58)  (5.65)  (3.26)  (5.61)  
Industry profitability 1.027  1.714*  -0.290  1.199  0.081  
 (1.25)  (1.81)  (-0.33)  (1.29)  (0.10)  
Industry risk -0.002  0.005  0.005  0.004  0.005  
 (-0.18)  (0.82)  (0.95)  (0.70)  (0.96)  
           
Inverse Mills ratio 0.182*  0.342*  0.292**  0.409*  0.348**  
 (1.73)  (1.95)  (2.22)  (1.81)  (2.18)  
Number of observations 1,037 1,037 361 361 544 544 266 266 610 610 
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Panel B: Treatment effect with maximum-likelihood estimation 
 Abnormal cash flow from 
operations  
Abnormal production costs  Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
REM1 REM2 
 Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome 
Rating existence   -0.424***   -0.518***   -0.475***   -0.643***   -0.547*** 
   (-5.39)   (-4.38)   (-5.04)   (-3.76)   (-5.01)    
Log(1 + firm age)   -0.149***   0.051   -0.080   -0.093   -0.047    
   (-3.61)   (0.67)   (-1.64)   (-0.96)   (-0.82)    
Ln(market value)   0.007   -0.054*   0.029   -0.116***   0.026    
    (0.35)   (-1.80)   (1.20)   (-2.66)   (0.94)    
Leverage   0.088*   0.026   0.136   0.051   0.173**  
    (1.83)   (0.35)   (1.50)   (0.42)   (2.06)    
Loss   -0.101*   0.103   0.073   0.028   0.012    
    (-1.91)   (1.14)   (1.02)   (0.21)   (0.15)    
Highly ranked underwriter   -0.085**   -0.088   -0.135***   -0.119   -0.152*** 
    (-2.48)   (-1.57)   (-2.63)   (-1.43)   (-2.69)    
Big6 auditor   0.024   0.150   0.069   0.160   -0.021    
    (0.49)   (1.47)   (0.95)   (1.20)   (-0.25)    
Venture capitalist   -0.064*   0.012   -0.032   -0.066   -0.049    
    (-1.65)   (0.20)   (-0.63)   (-0.64)   (-0.78)    
Industry-adjusted ROA   -0.718***   -0.479***   -0.269**   -0.351**   -0.247*** 
   (-10.27)   (-4.10)   (-2.20)   (-2.29)   (-2.58)    
CAPEX   0.018***   0.282***   0.006   0.237   0.034*** 
   (2.75)   (2.72)   (0.30)   (1.21)   (5.11)    
Intercept -2.251*** 0.306** -1.817*** 0.484** -1.997*** 0.195 -1.554*** 1.242*** -2.032*** 0.252    
 (-18.60) (2.57) (-11.51) (2.02) (-14.54) (1.37) (-9.55) (3.73) (-14.95)    (1.50)    
Industry fraction 9.538***   7.235***   10.425***   7.320***   9.712***   
 (7.93)   (4.21)   (6.58)   (4.02)   (6.09)      
Industry profitability 1.117   1.997*   -0.348   1.263   -0.122      
 (1.03)   (1.91)   (-0.38)   (1.30)   (-0.14)      
Industry risk -0.007   0.001   -0.001   0.001   0.000      
 (-1.62)   (0.33)   (-0.31)   (0.15)   (0.01)      
           
Likelihood ratio test against H0: 
ρ = 0  (p-value) 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
     
Number of observations 1,037 1,037 361 361 544 544 266 266 610 610 
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Panel C: Instrumental variable regression 
 Abnormal cash flow from 
operations  
Abnormal production costs  Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
REM1 REM2 
 Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome 
Rating existence  -1.525*  -1.592*  -2.122**  -1.847**  -4.055** 
  (-1.82)  (-1.91)  (-2.50)  (-1.98)  (-2.16) 
Log(1 + firm age) 0.045* -0.079 -0.041 0.000 -0.006 -0.076 -0.045 -0.163 0.015 0.036 
 (1.76) (-1.23) (-0.74) (0.00) (-0.18) (-0.94) (-0.69) (-1.17) (0.46) (0.24) 
Ln(market value) 0.050*** 0.080 0.070*** 0.059 0.040*** 0.113** 0.071*** 0.021 0.045*** 0.214** 
  (5.08) (1.55) (3.61) (0.83) (3.03) (2.36) (2.81) (0.23) (3.33) (1.98) 
Leverage 0.033** 0.137** 0.105*** 0.197 0.114*** 0.382** 0.147** 0.329 0.087*** 0.531** 
  (2.09) (2.16) (2.66) (1.41) (3.02) (2.36) (2.31) (1.45) (3.01) (2.41) 
Loss -0.042** -0.154** -0.008 0.054 -0.024 0.022 -0.006 0.004 -0.004 0.006 
  (-2.18) (-2.11) (-0.16) (0.45) (-0.64) (0.22) (-0.09) (0.02) (-0.12) (0.04) 
Highly ranked underwriter 0.047*** -0.012 0.038 -0.021 0.079** 0.033 0.065 0.004 0.072** 0.148 
  (2.60) (-0.21) (1.13) (-0.24) (2.53) (0.31) (1.60) (0.03) (2.55) (0.79) 
Big6 auditor 0.015 0.035 0.041 0.208 0.019 0.092 0.023 0.188 0.031 0.074 
  (0.52) (0.55) (0.77) (1.55) (0.56) (0.91) (0.32) (1.00) (0.84) (0.45) 
Venture capitalist -0.056*** -0.155** -0.074** -0.112 -0.061*** -0.167** -0.130** -0.282* -0.063*** -0.310** 
  (-4.12) (-2.36) (-2.10) (-1.03) (-2.93) (-2.00) (-2.39) (-1.66) (-2.99) (-2.10) 
Industry-adjusted ROA -0.006 -0.717*** 0.036 -0.424*** 0.010 -0.242* 0.088* -0.209 0.037* -0.082 
 (-0.52) (-9.99) (1.22) (-3.54) (0.27) (-1.72) (1.74) (-1.10) (1.67) (-0.57) 
CAPEX -0.001 0.017*** -0.074*** 0.174* -0.015** -0.022 -0.099* 0.071 -0.003* 0.023** 
 (-1.37) (2.76) (-3.01) (1.74) (-2.15) (-0.80) (-1.91) (0.36) (-1.70) (2.02) 
Intercept -0.291*** -0.074 -0.126 0.264 -0.266*** -0.319 -0.087 1.051* -0.275*** -0.809 
 (-4.83) (-0.28) (-0.62) (0.61) (-3.15) (-1.04) (-0.32) (1.84) (-3.61) (-1.29) 
Industry fraction 0.894***  0.925*  1.034***  1.355**  0.707**  
 (3.74)  (1.94)  (2.75)  (2.20)  (2.09)  
Industry profitability -0.055  0.131  -0.063  -0.077  -0.053  
 (-0.77)  (0.96)  (-0.46)  (-0.38)  (-0.46)  
Industry risk -0.001*  0.001  0.000  0.000  -0.000  
 (-1.71)  (0.26)  (0.08)  (0.02)  (-0.20)  
           
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
against H0: variables are 
exogenous (p-value) 
 
0.079 
 
0.004 
 
0.000 
 
0.002 
 
0.000 
     
Number of observations 1,037 1,037 361 361 544 544 266 266 610 610 
 
Table 4 presents the regression analyses of the association between real earnings management and credit ratings using three estimation approaches: Heckman two-step treatment effect model, 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) treatment effect model, and instrumental variable (IV) model. In the selection equation, rating existence is regressed on industry fraction, industry 
profitability, and industry risk. Industry fraction is the logarithm of one plus the percentage of firms having credit ratings in the same three-digit SIC industry as the IPO firm. Industry profitability 
is the median ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets of firms in the same three-digit SIC industry as the IPO firm. Industry risk is the standard 
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deviation of the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets of firms in the same three-digit SIC industry as the IPO firm. The outcome equation 
is: 
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑀𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑖𝑔6 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 +
𝛽8𝑉𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽
2011
1991 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖  
The dependent variable Real EM is abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary expenses, REM1 (the sum of abnormal production costs and abnormal 
discretionary expenses), or REM2 (the sum of abnormal cash flow from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses) in the offering year. Abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal 
production costs, abnormal discretionary expenses are estimated using models developed by Dechow et al. (1998) and implemented by Roychowdhury (2006). Abnormal cash flows from operations 
and abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied by minus one so that accrual-based and real earnings management proxies have the same interpretation. REM1 is the sum of abnormal production 
costs and abnormal discretionary expenses, and REM2 is the sum of abnormal cash flow from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses. Rating existence equals to one if the firm has a credit 
rating one month prior to the offering, and zero otherwise. Log(1+firm age) is the logarithm of one plus firm age in the offering year. Ln(market value) is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market 
value at the time of the listing. Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Loss equals to one if the firm has negative earnings before interest and taxes in the fiscal year prior to the 
offering, and zero otherwise. Highly ranked underwriter equals to one if the firm is underwritten by an underwriter which has a ranking score of 9.0 or above according to the underwriter rankings 
retrieved from Jay Ritter’s webpage, and zero otherwise. Big6 auditor equals to one if the firm is audited by a big six accounting firm (i.e., Arthur Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand, Ernst & Young, 
Deloitte & Touche, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers), and zero otherwise. Venture capitalist equals to one if the firm is venture backed, and zero otherwise. Industry-adjusted ROA is the firm’s 
ROA adjusted for the industry’s median ROA. CAPEX is the average capital expenditures in the offering year and one year after scaled by total assets at the beginning of the offering year. All 
regressions control for year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The test statistics 
are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 5 
Analyses of post-issue accounting performance 
 
Panel A: Analyses of post-issue CFO  
Dependent variable: Cash flow from operations  
 
Abnormal accruals Abnormal cash flow 
from operations 
Abnormal production 
costs 
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
REM1 REM2 
EM -0.034 -0.044 0.035 -0.059*** -0.026 -0.032    
 (-1.19) (-1.51) (1.31) (-2.65) (-1.23) (-1.31)    
EM*Rating existence 0.146*** 0.319** 0.230*** 0.202*** 0.131*** 0.293*** 
 (2.59) (2.26) (2.96) (3.16) (2.71) (3.68)    
CFO 0.044** 0.062*** 0.172*** 0.047** 0.156*** 0.056* 
 (2.15) (2.93) (6.63) (1.99) (6.38) (1.66) 
CAPEX 0.005 0.009** -0.093* 0.038 -0.069 0.029 
 (1.30) (2.46) (-1.92) (1.53) (-1.53) (1.63) 
Intercept 0.031 -0.131** -0.010 -0.021 -0.028 -0.034    
 (0.94) (-2.24) (-0.57) (-0.35) (-0.37) (-0.68)    
       
P-value of F-test [EM + 
EM*Rating existence= 0] 
0.035 0.058 0.001 0.025 0.041 0.001 
R-squared 0.172 0.279 0.547 0.281 0.545 0.227    
Number of observations 1,125 1,152 393 601 288 676    
 
Panel B: Analyses of post-issue ROA 
Dependent variable: ROA  
 
Abnormal accruals Abnormal cash flow 
from operations 
Abnormal production 
costs 
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
REM1 REM2 
EM -0.080* -0.061* -0.019 -0.087** -0.032 -0.024    
 (-1.73) (-1.92) (-0.57) (-2.15) (-1.32) (-0.68)    
EM*Rating existence 0.214*** 0.453*** 0.255*** 0.200** 0.186*** 0.319*** 
 (2.66) (3.44) (2.67) (2.14) (2.96) (3.26)    
ROA 0.042 0.055*** 0.072*** 0.022 0.064*** 0.040*   
 (1.38) (4.75) (4.82) (1.41) (9.55) (1.87)    
CAPEX 0.016 0.024*** -0.182** 0.023 -0.047 0.016**  
 (1.13) (3.82) (-2.54) (1.36) (-1.20) (2.35)    
Intercept -0.050 -0.127** -0.125*** -0.012 -0.121 -0.151**  
 (-1.37) (-2.28) (-5.80) (-0.18) (-1.33) (-2.39)    
       
P-value of F-test [EM + 
EM*Rating existence= 0] 
0.055 0.004 0.018 0.201 0.016 0.004 
R-squared 0.224 0.287 0.528 0.240 0.610 0.299    
Number of observations 1,125 1,152 393 601 288 676    
 
Table 5 presents the regression analyses of the association between at-issue earnings management and post-issue accounting performance. The regression equations are: 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡=1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡=0 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡=0 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡=0 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡=0 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡=0 + ∑ 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + ∑ 𝛽
2011
1991
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖 
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𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡=1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡=0 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡=0 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡=0 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡=0 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡=0 + ∑ 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + ∑ 𝛽
2011
1991
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖 
The dependent variable CFO is the cash flow from operations scaled by lagged total assets in the fiscal year following the offering, and ROA is the net income scaled by lagged total assets 
in the fiscal year following the offering. EM is the positive value of abnormal accruals, abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary expenses, 
REM1, or REM2. Abnormal accruals are estimated using the modified Jones (1991) model and adjusted for the abnormal accruals of a performance-matched non-IPO firm following Kothari 
et al. (2005). Abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary expenses are estimated using models developed by Dechow et al. (1998) and 
implemented by Roychowdhury (2006). Abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied by minus one so that accrual-based and real earnings 
management proxies have the same interpretation. REM1 is the sum of abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses, and REM2 is the sum of abnormal cash flow from 
operations and abnormal discretionary expenses.  Rating existence equals to one if the firm has a credit rating one month prior to the offering, and zero otherwise. CAPEX is the average 
capital expenditures in the offering year and one year after scaled by total assets at the beginning of the offering year. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects whose 
coefficients are suppressed. One, two and three asterisks denote the statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The test statistics are shown in parentheses below 
coefficient estimates. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.  
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Table 6 
Analyses of post-issue long-run stock performance 
 
Panel A: Analyses of post-issue long-run stock performance - Event-time approach 
Dependent variable: Post-issue three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) 
 
Abnormal accruals Abnormal cash flow 
from operations 
Abnormal production 
costs 
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
REM1 REM2 
EM -0.203* -0.093* -0.222** 0.015 -0.133 -0.059 
 (-1.80) (-1.67) (-2.18) (0.13) (-0.95) (-0.56) 
EM*Rating existence 1.224* 0.331 0.007 0.489 0.049 0.359 
 (1.90) (0.63) (0.02) (1.29) (0.21) (1.09) 
Underpricing -0.137 -0.236** 0.075 -0.234 0.215 -0.309    
  (-0.95) (-2.05) (0.18) (-0.87) (0.34) (-1.36)    
Log(1+firm age) -0.134 -0.078 0.088 -0.025 0.309* -0.170    
  (-1.22) (-0.71) (0.50) (-0.18) (1.89) (-1.18)    
Market BHR 0.121 0.481** 0.567 -0.165 -0.004 0.351    
 (0.57) (2.02) (1.31) (-0.53) (-0.01) (1.11)    
Book-to-market 0.179 0.117 -0.097 -0.037 -0.125 0.099    
 (1.53) (1.04) (-0.61) (-0.31) (-0.63) (0.85)    
Ln(market value) 0.005 -0.041 -0.056 0.039 -0.075 0.027    
 (0.11) (-1.01) (-0.86) (0.67) (-0.94) (0.49)    
ROA 0.012 -0.018 -0.000 0.027* 0.014 0.028*   
 (1.34) (-0.62) (-0.01) (1.75) (1.00) (1.80)    
Highly ranked underwriter 0.033 0.038 -0.060 -0.024 -0.073 0.071    
 (0.33) (0.40) (-0.45) (-0.20) (-0.49) (0.56)    
Big6 auditor 0.341*** 0.418*** 0.318 0.265* 0.388 0.308**  
 (3.07) (3.27) (1.20) (1.74) (1.54) (2.47)    
High-tech industry 0.275*** 0.192* 0.115 0.244 0.107 0.308*   
 (2.70) (1.94) (0.71) (1.63) (0.60) (1.92)    
Intercept -0.673** -0.914** -0.438 -0.251 0.087 -0.887* 
 (-2.02) (-2.48) (-0.64) (-0.51) (0.12) (-1.95) 
       
P-value of F-test [EM + 
EM*Rating existence= 0] 
0.114 0.653 0.572 0.211 0.766 0.397 
R-squared 0.086 0.056 0.115 0.079 0.174 0.059 
Number of observations 1,087 1,122 393 574 286 642 
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Panel B: Analyses of post-issue long-run stock performance - Calendar-time approach 
 
Abnormal accruals Abnormal cash flow 
from operations 
Abnormal production 
costs 
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
REM1 REM2 
Fama-French three-factor model       
Without credit ratings -0.007*** -0.004* -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 
 (-2.90) (-1.74) (-1.35) (-0.53) (-1.24) (-1.26)    
With credit ratings 0.001 -0.001 -0.010* 0.004 -0.003 0.002 
 (0.23) (-0.18) (-1.81) (0.80) (-0.53) (0.26) 
Carhart four-factor model       
Without credit ratings -0.006** -0.004* -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 
 (-2.36) (-1.82) (-1.59) (-0.65) (-1.47) (-1.55) 
With credit ratings 0.003 -0.004 -0.011* 0.002 -0.007 -0.003 
 (0.45) (-0.56) (-1.93) (0.42) (-0.96) (-0.45) 
 
Table 6 presents the regression analyses of the association between at-issue earnings management and post-issue long-run stock performance.  
Panel A shows the regression analyses of long-run stock performance over the three-year post-issue period. The regression equation is: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑀𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑛(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)𝑖 +
𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐵𝑖𝑔6 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽11𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽
2011
1991 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖  
 
The dependent variable BHAR is the firm’s post-issue three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return calculated starting from the day after the annual financial report date in the offering year to 
the earlier of the three year anniversary date or the delisting date. EM is the positive value of abnormal accruals, abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs, abnormal 
discretionary expenses, REM1, or REM2. Abnormal accruals are estimated using the modified Jones (1991) model and adjusted for the abnormal accruals of a performance-matched non-
IPO firm following Kothari et al. (2005). Abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary expenses are estimated using models developed by 
Dechow et al. (1998) and implemented by Roychowdhury (2006). Abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied by minus one so that accrual-
based and real earnings management proxies have the same interpretation. REM1 is the sum of abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses, and REM2 is the sum of 
abnormal cash flow from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses.  Rating existence equals to one if the firm has a credit rating one month prior to the offering, and zero otherwise. 
Underpricing is the firm’s initial returns on the first trading day. Log(1+firm age) is the logarithm of one plus firm age in in offering year. Market BHR is the three-year buy-and-hold value 
weighted market index return. Book to market is the ratio of book value to market value at the end of the fiscal year of the offering. Ln(market value) is the natural logarithm of the firm’s 
market value at the time of the listing. ROA is the net income scaled by lagged total assets in the offering year. Highly ranked underwriter equals to one if the firm is underwritten by an 
underwriter which has a ranking score of 9.0 or above according to the underwriter rankings retrieved from Jay Ritter’s webpage, and zero otherwise. Big6 auditor equals to one if the firm 
is audited by a big six accounting firm (i.e., Arthur Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand, Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers), and zero otherwise. High tech 
industry equals to one if the firm is in the high-tech industry, and zero otherwise. All regressions control for year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. One, two and three asterisks 
denote the statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The test statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity.  
Panel B shows the analyses of long-run abnormal stock returns from going long IPOs with upward earnings management and short IPOs with downward earnings management. The regression 
equation is: 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐸𝑀𝑝𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑀𝑝𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑚𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
POSEM – NEGEM is the return from taking a long position in a portfolio of IPO firms that manage earnings upward and a short position in a portfolio of IPO firms that manage earnings 
downward for each calendar month in the sample period. MKT is the excess monthly return on the value-weighted CRSP index for each calendar month in the sample period. SMB is the 
difference in the returns of value-weighted portfolios of small and large stocks for each calendar month in the sample period. HML is the difference in the returns of value-weighted portfolios 
of high book-to-market and low book-to-market stocks for each calendar month in the sample period. The IPO firm’s returns are included in the portfolio returns for the period of three years 
after the IPO fiscal year end. The Carhart four-factor model adds to the Fama and French three-factor model an additional factor to account for one-year momentum price return. The factors 
for those models are retrieved from Professor Kenneth French’s website.  
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Table 7 
Analyses of interaction effects between credit rating agencies and venture capitalists, top-tier investment banks, and Big Six auditors 
 
Panel A: Interaction effect between credit rating agencies and venture capitalists 
 
Abnormal 
accruals 
Abnormal cash flow 
from operations 
Abnormal 
production costs 
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
REM1 REM2 
Rating existence  -1.271** -1.628* -1.088* -2.136** -1.347** -3.456** 
 (-2.00) (-1.76) (-1.87) (-2.53) (-2.19) (-2.47) 
Venture capitalist  -0.126** -0.188** -0.128 -0.222** -0.313* -0.367** 
  (-2.51) (-2.27) (-1.11) (-2.35) (-1.77) (-2.54) 
Rating existence * Venture capitalist  1.044* 1.355* 0.935* 1.910** 1.007* 2.861** 
 (1.78) (1.69) (1.73) (2.49) (1.79) (2.40) 
       
P-value of F-test [Rating existence + Rating 
existence*Venture capitalist = 0] 
0.012 0.067 0.266 0.295 0.134 0.066 
Number of observations 1,000 1,037 361 544 266 610 
 
Panel B: Interaction effect between credit rating agencies and top-tier underwriters 
 
Abnormal 
accruals 
Abnormal cash flow 
from operations 
Abnormal 
production costs 
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
REM1 REM2 
Rating existence  -2.596** -3.871 0.448 -1.360 -0.617 -2.336 
 (-2.10) (-1.33) (0.64) (-1.31) (-0.63) (-1.06) 
Highly ranked underwriter -0.153** -0.242* -0.037 -0.218** -0.171 -0.294* 
  (-2.43) (-1.82) (-0.40) (-2.47) (-1.22) (-1.96) 
Rating existence * Highly ranked underwriter 2.384** 3.540 -0.489 1.164 0.469 2.088 
 (1.98) (1.27) (-0.73) (1.17) (0.51) (0.98) 
       
P-value of F-test [Rating existence + Rating existence* 
Highly ranked underwriter = 0] 
0.001 0.027 0.618 0.011 0.250 0.034 
Number of observations 1,000 1,037 361 544 266 610 
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Panel C: Interaction effect between credit rating agencies and Big Six auditors 
 
Abnormal 
accruals 
Abnormal cash flow 
from operations 
Abnormal 
production costs 
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
REM1 REM2 
Rating existence  -9.104 -11.382 6.351 -19.558 -0.862 -12.664    
 (-1.10) (-0.91) (0.99) (-1.46) (-0.31) (-1.20)    
Big6 auditor -0.315 -0.605 0.564 -0.845*** 0.102 -0.566*   
  (-1.25) (-0.96) (1.61) (-2.80) (0.35) (-1.73)    
Rating existence * Big6 auditor 8.899 11.038 -6.362 19.156 0.721 12.412    
 (1.08) (0.90) (-1.00) (1.43) (0.26) (1.18)    
       
P-value of F-test [Rating existence + Rating existence* 
Big6 auditor = 0] 
0.048 0.093 0.907 0.001 0.171 0.025 
Number of observations 1,000 1,037 361 544 266 610 
 
Table 7 presents the results of the instrumental variable regressions that analyse the association of earnings management and credit rating existence controlling for the interaction effects between 
credit rating agencies and venture capitalists, reputable investment banks, and Big Six auditors. All regressions include the same set of controls as the regressions presented in Table 3 and Table 4, 
but for the sake of brevity, we do not show the results of the control variables. One, two and three asterisks denote the statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The test 
statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.  
 
